

MNC-I BUA Intel Daily Slides

Feb 07

Approved for Release

~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI//20170201~~


Area of Interest Update


- 1.4b signals continued defiance; Palestinian truce holding; media claims captured soldiers
 - 1.4b nuclear negotiator stated enrichment would not be suspended, during press conference
 - Larijani signaled continued defiance of UN resolution when asked for response to recent IAEA proposal
 - Asserted national interests at stake; claimed Iran seeks solution through diplomatic dialogue
 - Ceasefire between Palestinian factions holding despite sporadic incidents of violence
 - Several recent assassinations of rival militants
 - Truce in effect since Tuesday, five days of intense violence preceded deal; schools, shops had closed
 - Regional satellite channel claiming 11 soldiers held captive by Islamic Courts Council (ICC) in Somalia
- 1.4b indicating dismissal of recent IAEA attempt to re-start negotiations; expect Palestinian truce to breakdown as 11 Feb unity deadline nears.



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Sources:





SECRET//REL TO USA, MCF//J20170201
For display only to IRQ

JAM Update

- Recent reporting:
 - Najaf OMS office denied MAS issued statement backing new Baghdad security plan
 - Challenged media 'to produce text of the statement'
 - Did not address whether MAS supported or opposed security plan
 - JAM members reportedly receive sniper training in Muthanna province
 - Training runs approximately 45 days, 15 students per group
 - Between Oct – Dec 06, two groups graduated

1.4b, 1.4d, 1.4c

- Graduates reportedly receive diploma signed by MAS



1.4c

5

SOURCES:

Open Source, BBC Monitoring: Iraq Media Review 25-31 Jan

1.4c

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Current Situation

- **Contractor aircraft shot down**
 - **Blackwater helicopter shot down south of Baghdad**
 - Aircraft reportedly received SAF, large caliber SAFIRE, made forced landing
 - SAFIRE included 7.62, 12.7mm
 - Crew, PAX recovered by second Blackwater helicopter
 - Aircraft later sanitized, destroyed in place by CF mounted patrol
 - **Indications of large caliber anti-aircraft weapons in the area**
 - Possible 23mm gun reported in vicinity following yesterday's incident
 - AQI anti-aircraft weapons reported near yesterday's crash site as of December
 - Cache recovered on 19 December contained several large caliber guns, ammunition
 - **SAFIRE incidents focused in MND-B, MND-N**
 - SAFIRE incidents averaged 55 per month in 2006, majority of incidents SAF attacks, majority ineffective
 - 70 SAFIRE incidents in January, maintaining above average trend for fifth straight month
 - **Four aircraft lost to SAFIRE, MANPADs in January**
 - All rotary wing; three resulted in A/C losses, one recovered by ground assets
 - **No attack claims, methodology suggest Sunni extremist, resistance groups**
 - A/C losses historically exploited by multiple extremist, resistance IO forums
 - Aircraft likely target of opportunity while over-flying extremist operating area
- *Opportunistic SAFIRE attack likely executed by Sunni extremist elements. Multiple groups will likely claim responsibility; expect IO portraying ability to successfully engage iconic CF target.*


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SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:

1.4c

CIDNE Trends Data



Data represents reporting from CIDNE (contains NJOC data).
Data time period: 190001DEC06 – 252400DEC06

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STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- LATE 2006

- The conflict in Iraq increasingly transitions into a struggle between Sunni and Shi'a extremists seeking to control key areas in Baghdad, create/protect sectarian enclaves, divert economic resources, and impose their political and religious agendas. Baghdad defines the conflict and remains the focus for sectarian violence. Death squads locked in mutually-reinforcing cycles of sectarian strife forcing Sunni and Shi'a to accept militias for safety. Sectarian violence spreading to Diyala, Kirkuk with competition for provincial influence. Southern Iraq and Anbar conflicts over political and tribal control, CF presence.
- Sunni extremists continue efforts to expel CF, make Iraq ungovernable and perpetuate sectarian violence in Baghdad, Diyala and Kirkuk. AQI leadership increasingly convergent with AQSL on goals and strategy. Capable cellular networks provide resilience, despite CF operations disrupting leadership. Attacks focus on civilians and ISF with Umar Brigade as AQI's anti-Shi'a death squad front.
- Shi'a extremist influence on national and provincial political agendas through infiltration and intimidation further challenges ISF/CF ability to maintain security. Shi'a extremists sponsor death squads within and outside Baghdad to secure Shi'a enclaves from "Ba'athist Belts" by portraying themselves as Shi'a protectors and eliminating Sunni competition; prime agents of sectarian violence.
- Sunni Rejectionists continue decentralized, disorganized marginalization. Some hardliners, increasingly augmenting ranks of Sunni extremists, providing professional military effort to expel CF, prevent Shi'a economic, territorial gains and reverse Sunni political skills. Moderates will accept reconciliation, disarmament once death squads eliminated, Shi'a militia disarmed and key political demands met.

1.4b, 1.4d

- Maliki Government asserting itself on security issues. Sectarian agendas within key ministries, questionable dependability of MoI elements, rivalry for control of key resources and limited influence of central government outside Baghdad remain challenges. Iraqi government failure to eliminate death squads, control sectarian violence, generate economic growth, and establish an inclusive political environment free from undue 1.4b, 1.4d pose the greatest long-term risks to MNF objectives.

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Area of Interest Update

- Arab League aims to solve Beirut crisis; Hamas ambush strains truce; Islamists plan insurgency
 - Arab League Secretary General coordinating with Saudi Arabia, Iran for Lebanese political agreement
 - Secretary Gen. planning 8 Feb meeting in Beirut to discuss possible political reconciliation framework
 - Nasrallah speech on A'shura warned "resistance groups" against civil war; viewed as pacifying
 - Hamas ambushed four-truck Fatah convoy after entering Gaza from Israel, straining current truce
 - Several Fatah security force officers killed, 30 civilians reportedly wounded
 - Hamas claimed convoy carrying weapons to Fatah; Fatah stated convoy carrying medical equipment
 - Somali website stated ICC mobilizing for "hit-and-run war," intends to target Ethiopian, Somali forces
- *Nasrallah likely pressured by Iran to make conciliatory comments, enable success of Saudi-Iranian-sponsored Arab League initiative.*




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
Sources:

OSC [1.4c] Saudi Daily Cites Lebanese Officials on Ongoing Saudi, [1.4b] Efforts

Reuters, 1 Feb 07, Hamas Gunmen Ambush Gaza Convoy, Four Killed

OSC (b)(6) Somalia Islamist Forces Reportedly Led by Aweys Mobilize for "Hit-and-Run War"





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For display only to IRQ

JAM Update

• Recent reporting:

- Sharp dispute has erupted within senior Sadrists over authority to designate JAM members for BSP
 - Qays al-Khaz'ali has developed list of JAM members to serve as Sadr City IP's in support of BSP
 - OMS political committee did not authorize list and are taking steps to annul it
- Sunnis denied agreement with Sadrists on Baghdad security
 - Late Jan, senior Sadrist Baha al-Araji announced agreement between Sadrists, Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) to form joint security committees
 - IIP leader, Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi denied agreement was reached
 - Stated security situation is 'so complicated' these committees will not solve the security problem



Assessment: Sadr's absence and apparent lack of guidance resulting in unclear lines of authority as well as infighting among his senior followers. Sadrist consensus for JAM to have cooperative security role in Sadr City; implications for other Sadrist Baghdad strongholds are unclear. Sadrists unlikely to cease sectarian operations targeting Sunnis. Deep mistrust makes formation of any Sadr/IIP security alliance unlikely.

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Current Situation

- **Suicide attack in Hilla**
 - Coordinated suicide attack targeted market in Hilla
 - Two suicide vests targeted Shi'a civilians; reportedly nearly 200 casualties
 - Last major attack in Hilla killed 125 LNs in February 2005
 - January high profile attacks above norm
 - 114 HP incidents nationwide in January, up 15% from 2006 average of 99
 - 73 VBIED incidents in January, highest VBIED month since May 2005, up significantly from 2006 average of 48
 - 17 SVBIEDs in January, down 42% from 2006 monthly average of 31
 - 13 suicide vests in January, highest SVEST month since February 2005, up 4 from 2006 average of 9
 - Total HP attack casualties during January up 56% from 2006 average of 974
 - Highest total since July 2006
 - No attack claims; targeting, reporting indicate AQI-affiliated Sunni extremist organizations
 - Continued focus on Shi'a civilian crowds to maximize casualties
 - Threat reporting indicated AQI intended to target Shi'a crowds in Babil province during A'shura
 - Timing, location of attack possibly shifted due to increased A'shura security
- **Extremists modified method of HP attacks: increasing SVEST, VBIED; decreasing SVBIED in January, likely due to colder weather enabling SVEST concealment, increased security driving variations. Change of tactics increased high profile operational effectiveness.**

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SCRIPT:

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Outlook: IO Themes and Effects

Terrorists and Foreign Fighters (T&FF)

- ISI/AQI propaganda volume up 59 to 436
 - Released statement claiming full control of all districts of Diyala Province
 - Demanded three ~~4b, 1.4~~ captured in Mosul be handed over to them
 - Claimed to cause US forces to “flee” in three engagements
- AS propaganda volume down 4 to 49
 - Claimed assassination of US Embassy employee
- IAI propaganda volume up 1 to 96
 - Denied decrease in operations
- Miscellaneous propaganda volume down 44 to 18

Sunni Resistance

- Propaganda volume down 7 to 48
 - 1920 BDE claimed to down helicopter on 23 Jan in Al Fadl area of Baghdad
 - Call & Encampment BDE claimed to down a Black Hawk on 26 Jan in Al Anbar
 - 1920 BDE republished key points of group creed; Called for support and patience
 - Ba’ath Party released repeated calls for party unity, commitment to cause
 - Ameriyah Forces Command (AFC) released messages detailing Iraqi Resistance objectives; outlined CF and Resistance negotiation points

Assessment: Propaganda volume remained steady. Attacks against CF helicopters, proclamation of group objectives common themes this week. AFC opposing CF and Sunni Resistance negotiations unless key Sunni demands met. Expect higher level of SAFIRE against CF aircraft to continue due to perceived IO success, increased calls for unity of Sunni groups against Shia militants.

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STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- LATE 2006

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- Shi'a extremist influence on national and provincial political agendas through infiltration and intimidation further challenges ISF/CF ability to maintain security. Shi'a extremists sponsor death squads within and outside Baghdad to secure Shi'a enclaves from "Ba'athist Belts" by portraying themselves as Shi'a protectors and eliminating Sunni competition; prime agents of sectarian violence.
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1.4b, 1.4d


- Maliki Government asserting itself on security issues. Sectarian agendas within key ministries, questionable dependability of MoI elements, rivalry for control of key resources and limited influence of central government outside Baghdad remain challenges. Iraqi government failure to eliminate death squads, control sectarian violence, generate economic growth, and establish an inclusive political environment free from undue 1.4b, 1.4d pose the greatest long-term risks to MNF objectives.


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1.4b, 1.4d, 1.4c

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


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For display only to IRO

JAM Update

• Recent reporting:

- JAM in Shurta, Baghdad plan to avoid CF during Operation TOGETHER FORWARD
 - Shurta JAM elements reportedly scared of CF and do not want to fight them
 - JAM hopes CF 'wipes out' local Sunni fighters in neighboring Duwanim instead
- 2 Feb media reports Sadrists placed decision for disbanding JAM with religious leaders
 - Said Grand Ayatollah Sistani in Najaf and Grand Ayatollah Ha'iri in Iran 'responsible for disbanding or keeping' JAM
 - Sadr aide asserted 'Sadr visited Sistani, discussed disbanding JAM and the latter refused'



Assessment: Most JAM Baghdad elements believed to be adopting defensive posture; assess this will compel CF/ISF to primarily target Sunni extremists. This perception may be driving recent expressions of support for TOGETHER FORWARD from some Sadrists. Deferring to religious authorities allows Sadr to remove himself from responsibility for disarming JAM. Sadr likely believes Sistani views JAM as last alternative for protecting Shi'a, will not force JAM to disarm.

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Current Situation

- **SAFIRE incident North of Baghdad**
 - **AH-64 reported shot down by suspected large-caliber SAFIRE near Taji**
 - Wingman reported SAFIRE as likely cause of incident
 - Catastrophic crash, crew KIA
 - Multiple IEDs encountered by mounted patrol sent to secure crash site
 - **Five rotary wing aircraft lost to enemy action in last 30 days**
 - **Significant increase in successful aircraft engagements**
 - Most incidents involved SAFIRE from large-caliber weapons; one complex attack, possibly employing MANPAD, SAFIRE
 - Large caliber weapons, ammunition recently recovered from caches
 - **Methodology similar to recent incidents in rural areas surrounding Baghdad**
 - Selection of remote area frequented by CF air assets, possible IED emplacement to impede QRF response
 - **Reporting, methodology suggests Sunni insurgents responsible**
 - Reporting indicates specific Sunni insurgent group possibly carried out attack using large caliber weapon mounted on truck, claimed attack included "Strela" MANPAD
 - Indicated attack was preplanned due to observation of airborne patrols in area over time
 - Recent Sunni extremist, insurgent success against aircraft possibly spurring similar attacks
- ***SAFIRE attack likely carried out by Sunni insurgent elements. Expect SAFIRE attacks to continue as enemy forces emboldened by perceived IO success of recent engagements.***

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SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:

1.4c

CIDNE Trends Data

SECRET//REL TO USA, MCF//30170202
For display only to IRQ

Outlook: Increasing IED Effectiveness in Mosul

- Significant spike in lethality of IED attacks
 - Jan, 29 effective IED attacks
 - Jan, 6 CF KIA, 25 CF WIA
 - Dec, 0 CF KIA, 8 CF WIA
 - Nov, 4 CF KIA, 11 CF WIA
- Insurgents benefiting from Iraqi Army Lead (IAL); becoming more proficient
 - Recent battle space turnover, reduction of CF; greater FOM to conduct attacks
 - Increased usage of improvised containers for explosive delivery
- 15 Jan, CWIED; buried, consisted of 1000 lbs HE within industrial size acetylene tanks
- IED attacks in Mosul remain the most common attack targeting CF
 - Average 23 IED attacks/week targeting CF over a twelve-week period
 - Common munitions between 57 mm to 155 mm readily available
 - IED cells utilize additional time and FOM resulting from M&I on IP, for improved emplacement



Assessment: IED attacks account for the majority of insurgent operations targeting CF in Mosul. The recent increase in lethality of IED attacks attributable to improved insurgent TTPs, increased FOM derived from IAL and M&I targeting IP. Expect Insurgents to identify and duplicate most effective attack methods.

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1.4b, 1.4d

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Area of Interest Update

- Ten arrested for terror funding in Saudi; factions pledge third truce in Gaza; envoys tour nuke site
 - Saudi Arabian interior ministry announced arrest of ten people for suspicion of funding terror activity
 - Seven Saudis, one foreigner arrested while meeting in Jeddah on Friday, two other Saudis in separate raids
 - Interior Ministry: the money was being used to lure “the sons of the nation to disturbed places”
 - Palestinian factions met Saturday to attempt third ceasefire since Tuesday
 - Inter-factional engagements continued; makeshift checkpoints reported throughout Gaza
 - Following meeting PM Haniyah appealed for calm, called for fighters to withdrawal from streets
 - Non-aligned Movement envoys toured Iranian uranium conversion site at Isfahan
 - Iranian officials stressed “transparency” during visit
- *Palestinian leaders likely reluctant to fully restrain respective factions prior to upcoming Mecca peace conference for resolute posture.*

Saudi Arabia





Ahmadinejad at Isfahan



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Sources:





SECRET//BEI TO USA, MCF//20170204
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JAM Update

• Recent reporting:

- JAM commander in Mu'alif, SW Baghdad ordered followers to cease attacks against CF unless necessary for self-defense
 - JAM ordered to keep weapons out of sight, members targeted by CF ordered to relocate
 - JAM to abide orders until otherwise instructed
 - JAM also ordered to stop fighting among themselves
- Mu'alif JAM elements intended to reinforce Basrah associates, late Jan
 - Basrah JAM reportedly short of ammunition following engagement with police commandos
 - Baghdad group struggling to obtain ammunition on short notice



Assessment: JAM leadership continues to convey MAS mid-Jan message condoning JAM defensive, but not offensive attacks on CF. JAM leadership believes low-profile, defensive posture best way to limit impact of new Baghdad security plan, HVI targeting. Continued lack of direction from senior-most Sadrist leadership may be causing infighting among lower ranks. CF/ISF targeting of JAM leadership possibly starting to impact JAM logistical networks.

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Current Situation

- **Complex, coordinated attack in Kirkuk**
 - Multiple IEDs, VBIEDs detonated within three hour period
 - 1 x SVBIED targeted Kurdish Democratic Party Substation
 - 3 x IEDs detonated in northern Kirkuk
 - One targeted home of PUK member
 - 6 x VBIEDs detonated within mixed areas in central, southern Kirkuk
 - Four reportedly targeted known Kurdish interests
 - Reportedly 25 cumulative casualties, all civilians
 - Over the past 12 months, 14 multiple-VBIED days occurred in Kirkuk
 - Six days totaled at least three; the highest was six on 15 October 06
 - Incidents yesterday exceeded Kirkuk monthly average; highest day on record
 - Methodology, targeting indicate AS, AQI involvement
 - Targets likely chosen to degrade public perception of ISF ability to provide security, undermine KDP/PUK
 - Attack possibly timed to coincide with ISI announcement of plan to counter new MNF strategy
 - Claimed plan “does not include Baghdad alone;” will “expand the circle of battles”
- **Targeting, resultant low casualty numbers indicative of AS involvement in yesterday’s attack, number of VBIEDs suggests AQI facilitation. Expect continued coordinated attacks to destabilize Kirkuk, undermine Kurdish political leadership. AQI possibly seeking to demonstrate MNF strategy failure outside of capital.**

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SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:

1.4c

CIDNE Trends Data

SECRET//REL TO USA, MCF//20170204
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Current Situation

- **Suicide attack in Hit**
 - **SVEST targeted ISF in Hit**
 - Attacker reportedly approached IP CP on bridge
 - 5 IP Casualties, 5 civilian casualties
 - **Attacks targeting ISF in MNF-W increased since June 2006**
 - Last 7 months exceeded 2006 average of 131 attacks per month
 - Majority of attacks were SAF (726 of 1576) with many complex incidents
 - IED attacks second most frequent (298); IDF third most frequent (291)
 - Last four out of five months high profile attacks above 2006 average of six per month
 - January 2007 two above average at eight
 - **Attacks targeting ISF in MNF-W AQI, Sunni extremist tool**
 - Intended to protect critical LOCs, maintain freedom of maneuver, contribute to ongoing IO campaign
 - Attempt to discredit ISF capability to protect populace, persuade public to trust extremists for protection
 - **ISF in MNF-W continues to develop locally-manned presence, capability, demonstrate professionalism despite extremist attacks**
- ***Sunni extremist organizations in MNF-W continuing pressure on ISF in attempt to protect freedom to operate, enable IO effort by discrediting ISF, Anbar authorities. Expect attacks targeting ISF to continue as Iraqis develop effective, locally-manned security forces.***



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SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:

1.4c

CIDNE Trends Data



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Outlook: Islamic State of Iraq Vulnerabilities

- Senior al-Qai'da (AQ) religious adviser addresses concerns of current al-Qai'da in Iraq (AQI) and potential Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) supporters:
 - Suggested proclamation of the ISI not unilateral; had widespread support
 - Responded to concerns over lack of territorial sovereignty, claiming ISI "controls" al-Anbar
 - Dismissed doubts regarding Egyptian-born AQI leader Abu Ayyub al-Masri's (AAM) right to lead
 - Stated ISI head Umar al-Baghdadi is well known in Iraq; al-Baghdadi's claim to "Commander of the Faithful" title applies only to Iraq
- Foreign jihadist support one key element to AQI's ability to fight
 - Jihadist imams abroad identify, indoctrinate, recruit foreign fighters (FF)
 - Foreign-based jihadist networks facilitate FF, materials, money into Iraq
 - Wealthy jihadist donors continue to finance AQI operations

Assessment: AQI's proclaimed establishment of the ISI has proven more of a liability than a successful strategic maneuver. Rejection of the ISI concept by non-Iraqi jihadist supporters could disrupt several key enablers of AQI operations. Expect continued AQ and AQI efforts to gain support from Sunni religious leaders, insurgent groups and external supporters to bolster the ISI's legitimacy.

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Area of Interest Update

- Syrian official denies facilitation involvement; media airs ISI video; UAE adds women to council
 - Former Syrian Information Minister denied claim 50% of suicide bombers pass through Syria
 - Stated “if Iraqi government had one piece of evidence, they would have presented it a long time ago”
 - Claimed accusation aimed at disturbing Syrian-Iraqi relations
 - Al-Jazeera aired video from ISI [AQI] allegedly documenting shoot down of AH-64 on 2 February
 - Group claimed responsibility, stated incident took place near Taji
 - Video shows apparent missile fired at AH-64; helicopter appears to trail smoke, descend behind hill
 - UAE leaders appointed eight women to 40-seat Federal National Council (FNC)
 - No legislative power, advisory role to Emirates rulers
 - UAE held first ever election in December; fewer than 1% of population allowed to vote, chosen by rulers
- 1.4b, 1.4d, 1.4c



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31

Sources:

OSC

1.4c


 Syria: Former Information Minister Denies Syrian Involvement in Iraq's Bombings

OSC

1.4c

 Al-Jazeera Reports on Video of Downing US Helicopter in al-Taji


Reuters, 4 Feb 07, UAE Names Eight Women to Advisory Council



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JAM Update

- Senior Diwaniyah OMS official ruled out holding talks with CF
 - ‘We reject negotiating with [CF] or sitting with their representatives at the same table’
 - JAM maintains Sadr City-like safe haven in northeastern quarter of Diwaniyah
- Senior Sadrist spokesman Shaykh Khalil al-Maliki, found dead in Basrah, 4 Feb
 - Reportedly killed by an unidentified gunmen
 - 8 Dec 06, Maliki threatened attacks by his tribe against Basrah governorate buildings
 - Demanded release of detainees from Maliki’s tribe captured by CF
 - Detainees members of JAM IDF, assassination team



Assessment: *Diwaniyah OMS likely responding to reported negotiations between Sadr City mayor, OMS/JAM and CF, GoI regarding support for Baghdad security plan. Statement may reflect emerging divisions among OMS leaders during Sadr’s absence. Retaliatory attacks possible from Basrah JAM and/or tribal followers against perceived assailants given al-Maliki’s prominence in Basrah, advocacy of Sadrists’ interests.*

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33

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Current Situation

- **Sectarian IDF attacks in Baghdad**
 - **Mortar fire targeted mosque in Adhamiyah**
 - Abu Hanifa Mosque (Sunni) targeted by 14 X 81mm mortars
 - Point of origin in Shi'a section of Adhamiyah
 - Reportedly eight civilian casualties, one house set ablaze
 - **IDF targeting civilians in Baghdad returned to typical level following A'shura spike**
 - January averaged less than two IDF attacks against civilians per day until 29 January – 1 February when attacks spiked to 11 per day; 19 attacks on 30 January
 - IDF returned to more typical level 2 – 4 February
 - Majority of IDF attacks during spike took place in Adhamiyah, Kadhamiyah
 - Last six months averaged 29 IDF attacks targeting civilians per month
 - 73 IDF attacks reported in January; over double monthly average
 - **IDF attacks conducted by both Sunni, Shi'a elements for various reasons**
 - Cyclic IDF likely prompted by 29 January IDF against Shi'a mosque in Zafaraniya
 - Increased employment of IDF possibly due to increased CF, ISF security operations resulting in restricted freedom of movement, operation
 - Shi'a IDF likely prompted by initial Sunni IDF during A'shura, recent high profile attacks
 - IDF provides greater deniability, standoff distance than typical M&E activity
- ***IDF exchanges in Baghdad spiked during A'shura likely prompted by Sunni attacks on iconic religious sites, Shi'a retaliatory fire. Expect IDF to sustain typical lower level, cyclic exchanges; although future Baghdad security operations may drive IDF increase due to further restricted militant FOM.***


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SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:

1.4c

CIDNE Trends Data



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STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- LATE 2006

- The conflict in Iraq increasingly transitions into a struggle between Sunni and Shi'a extremists seeking to control key areas in Baghdad, create/protect sectarian enclaves, divert economic resources, and impose their political and religious agendas. Baghdad defines the conflict and remains the focus for sectarian violence. Death squads locked in mutually-reinforcing cycles of sectarian strife forcing Sunni and Shi'a to accept militias for safety. Sectarian violence spreading to Diyala, Kirkuk with competition for provincial influence. Southern Iraq and Anbar conflicts over political and tribal control, CF presence.
- Sunni extremists continue efforts to expel CF, make Iraq ungovernable and perpetuate sectarian violence in Baghdad, Diyala and Kirkuk. AQI leadership increasingly convergent with AQSL on goals and strategy. Capable cellular networks provide resilience, despite CF operations disrupting leadership. Attacks focus on civilians and ISF with Umar Brigade as AQI's anti-Shi'a death squad front.
- Shi'a extremist influence on national and provincial political agendas through infiltration and intimidation further challenges ISF/CF ability to maintain security. Shi'a extremists sponsor death squads within and outside Baghdad to secure Shi'a enclaves from "Ba'athist Belts" by portraying themselves as Shi'a protectors and eliminating Sunni competition; prime agents of sectarian violence.
- Sunni Rejectionists continue decentralized, disorganized marginalization. Some hardliners, increasingly augmenting ranks of Sunni extremists, providing professional military effort to expel CF, prevent Shi'a economic, territorial gains and reverse Sunni political skills. Moderates will accept reconciliation, disarmament once death squads eliminated, Shi'a militia disarmed and key political demands met.

1.4b, 1.4d



- Maliki Government asserting itself on security issues. Sectarian agendas within key ministries, questionable dependability of MoI elements, rivalry for control of key resources and limited influence of central government outside Baghdad remain challenges. Iraqi government failure to eliminate death squads, control sectarian violence, generate economic growth, and establish an inclusive political environment free from undue 1.4b, 1.4d pose the greatest long-term risks to MNF objectives.

36

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Area of Interest Update

- Al-Assad rhetoric; Iranian installation; Israeli call for Barghouti's release
 - President al-Assad stated Syria capable of brokering peace in Iraq
 - Claimed Syria has credibility necessary to mediate sectarian truce; MNF approach flawed:
 - “After nearly four years of occupation, they haven’t learned their lesson, they haven’t started the dialogue”
 - Denied allegations Syria assisting foreign fighter facilitation, stated US looking for “scapegoats”
 - IAEA officials assert Iran has begun industrial-scale centrifuge installation at Natanz
 - Claimed two sets of 164 centrifuges installed as vanguard for planned total of 3,000 by June
 - Iran planning announcement of “significant” nuclear progress on 11 February to commemorate Islamic Rev
 - Senior Kadima minister called for release of Marwan Barghouti to support Fatah, secularism
 - Barghouti serving five life sentences in Israeli prison for murder; viewed as most popular Palestinian leader
- *Barghouti widely regarded as only person able to unify factions, rein in militants, re-invigorate peace process.*





Marwan Barghouti

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Information compiled from open sources **37**

Sources:





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JAM Update

- Sadrist-associated officials in Baghdad announce delay in new security measures
 - Sadrist Deputy Mayor of Baghdad, Kabbi said BSP delayed “because Iraqi Army is not ready”
 - Sadr City Mayor Daraji publicly stated new plan may not be in place for another 15 to 20 days
- 4 Feb, JAM cell leader Khazim al-Hamdani killed during ISF/CF operation in Baqubah
 - Sadrist parliamentary spokesman alleged Hamdani was “stabbed with a bayonet”



Assessment: Sadrist comments on ISF readiness possibly aimed at bolstering JAM's position as Shi'a protector. Public statements also demonstrate level of desire by Sadrist leaders in Sadr City to be publicly associated with BSP preparations, increase popular legitimacy. Hamdani's death is unlikely to significantly disrupt JAM operations in Diyala.

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Current Situation

- **High profile effectiveness against civilians up over last three months**
 - **Civilian casualties up while incident totals remained steady**
 - **HP casualties per incident rising since November**
 - Last three months effectiveness steadily increased from 26 casualties/incident in November to 36 casualties/incident in January
 - **HP incidents against civilians remained steady at average of 23**
 - 9 of last 12 months HP incidents against civilians close to historical mean
 - » September, October 2006 incidents below average, likely due to Ramadan
 - » November 2006 incidents above average
 - Total January 2007 incidents same as 12-month average
 - **Last three months complex incidents more than double 12-month average**
 - **High profile effectiveness attributed to extremist tactical refinement**
 - Increased focus on high civilian concentration areas
 - Increased employment of complex, coordinated attacks in last three months
 - Possible indications of extremists striving to increase explosives yield
- ***Sunni extremists demonstrating increased lethality per incident in last three months due to continued advances in VBIED employment, target selection. Expect Rusafa VBIED attacks to be less effective in near term as facilitation networks reconstitute after recent CF degradation of senior leadership.***

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SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:

CIDNE Trends Data

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CIVIL WAR: INDICATORS		
Indicator	Trend	Reporting: 27 Jan - 2 Feb 2007
Ethno-sectarian identities are the overriding force driving decision-making	↔	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> President Talabani met with US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and discussed security, political process and national reconciliation. IIP leader, Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi denied agreement with Sadrist on Baghdad security has been reached.
Unrestrained, self-sustained sectarian strife across multiple provinces	↑	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> National Sectarian incidents: 207; up 19% previous week National Sectarian casualties: 1068; up 51% National executions: 256 KIA; up 11% Baghdad Sectarian incidents: 183; up 22% Baghdad Sectarian casualties: 661; up 15% Baghdad executions: 237 KIA; up 21%
Ethno-sectarian mobilization	↔	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Basrah JAM reportedly short of ammunition following engagement with police commandos; Baghdad group struggling to obtain ammunition on short notice; JAM ordered to keep weapons out of sight in Sadr City.
Population movements	↑	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Internally displaced families in Iraq: IOM: 60,243 (no new data); MoDM: 72,000 (up 16,997), approximately 432,000 total individuals Forced displacement predominately in Rashid and northern Karkh.
Assessment: JAM logistic networks potentially affected by ISF/CF targeting of JAM leadership. JAM continuing low-profile, defensive posture to limit Baghdad security plan impact, reduce exposure to HVI targeting; however forced displacement activity evident in select areas.		
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CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCF//20170207

Area of Interest Update

- Palestinian leaders meet in Mecca; Iran blames CF for diplomat abduction; IRGC to test missiles
 - Abbas and Hamas leaders arrived in Mecca for peace negotiations
 - Hamas spokesman claimed both sides now have resolve necessary to reach durable unity agreement
 - Senior Abbas aide stated talks will aim to persuade Hamas to accept program of PLO
 - Acceptance of PLO program would implicitly recognize Israel, set conditions to end economic blockade
 - Iranian FM spokesman blamed CF for abduction of Jalal Sharafi, Iranian embassy second secretary
 - Sharafi reportedly abducted Sunday in Karrada by men wearing IA uniforms
 - Claimed Sharafi kidnapped by group linked to MoD, “which works under the supervision of [MNF]”
 - IRGC-AF, Navy announced military exercise for southern, central Persian Gulf, Sea of Oman
 - Two-day exercise to begin today, to include “missile interception and test firing”
- *Influential ministerial positions likely to remain key negotiating point for Palestinians; expect wide-spread violence if peace talks fail.*




Information compiled from open sources 43


Sources:

Reuters, 6 Feb 07, Palestinian Rivals Land in Saudi for Unity Talks

BBC, 6 Feb 07, Iran Envoy ‘Abducted in Baghdad’

OSD (b)(6) 1.4b to Test Missiles in Upcoming Maneuvers in Gulf, Oman Sea





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JAM Update

- Sadrist spokesman identified Khazim al-Hamdani as director of Sadr's political office in Diyala
 - Hamdani was killed 4 Feb during CF/ISF operation in Baqubah
 - Spokesman denied press reports Hamdani was 'rogue JAM' or had distanced himself from Sadr movement
 - Spokesman called the death a 'provocation'
- Sadrist attended conference in Kirkuk of groups opposed to joining Kurdistan region, 4 Feb
 - Participants reportedly included Sadrists and members from Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party
 - Conference spokesman said participants demanded Gol postpone implementation of Article 140, dealing with status of Kirkuk
 - Article 140 reverses Kirkuk Arabization



Assessment: Hamdani's death will likely further increase Sadrist leadership paranoia of CF, ISF targeting. Sadrists attendance at the Kirkuk conference reaffirms commitment to representing Shi'a interests nationally; cooperation with Sunni groups to achieve local goals.

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Current Situation

- **IED attacks in Kirkuk**
 - **Three IEDs targeted Kurdish families**
 - Devices placed near front gate of each home, located in same area
 - Kurdish victims claimed targeted for living in Arab neighborhood
 - Local IP detained civilian male who lives nearby
 - **IED attacks targeting civilians up in 2007**
 - **January 2007 highest number of IED attacks on civilians in Kirkuk on record**
 - More than double 2006 average of five per month
 - February on track to exceed January high
 - **Overall attack totals high, not unprecedented; increased focus on civilians**
 - 2006 average of 24 total attacks per month, 18% targeted civilians
 - January 2007 30 total attacks, 37% targeted civilians
 - **Increased Sunni insurgent targeting of civilians to intimidate, extort funds**
 - **5 February incident possibly indicates successful local recruitment, facilitation by larger Sunni extremist organizations**
 - Recent reporting indicated AAS threats to Kurds living in Arab neighborhoods
 - Incidents likely aim to intimidate, force relocation of Kurdish families
 - Civilian attacks also likely intended to undermine security, discredit IG
 - Other recent attacks assessed as intended to extort money from LNs
- ***Kirkuk attack trends indicate targeting shift, greater targeting of Kurdish civilians. Expect targeting of Kurds to continue as Sunni extremists, insurgents seek to reduce Kurdish presence in Arab enclaves.***

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SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:

MNC-I SIGACTS:

1.4c

CIDNE Trends Data

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Outlook: Shi'a Fringe

- Recent conflict in Najaf highlights potential threat of apocalyptic Shi'a groups
- Jund al-Sama; "Soldiers of Heaven"
 - Led by Diya Kazim Abd al-Zahrah (deceased)
 - Believed destruction of Shi'a leadership in Najaf would trigger revelation of Mahdi
 - Likely retains presence in Hilla, Kut, Basra
- Jaysh al Sarkhi; "Army of Guardians"
 - Led by Mahmud al-Hassani al-Sarkhi who claims direct contact with Mahdi
 - Sarkhi was a disgruntled student of Muhammad al-Sadr, Muqtada's father
 - In conflict with Sadrists, 1.4b CF, and Gol
- Several smaller groups:
 - Jund Allah – led by Ahmad al-Hassan; created just after US invasion
 - Al-Mumahhidun - led by Muhsin al Hamami; main presence in Basrah
 - Al-Musta'jilun – believes sowing corruption will accelerate Mahdi's return
- Media reaction generally ambivalent or negative toward these groups; little public reaction underscores their marginality



Assessment: Majority of groups' theology centers around revelation of 12th Imam or Mahdi. Fanatical, militant nature of such groups may present danger out of proportion with limited membership, influence; engagements with larger groups could cause significant ISF casualties. Lack of significant public support will likely minimize overall impact of groups.

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STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- Early 2007

- The nature of the enemy and the conflict in Iraq has shifted from a Sunni-led resistance against perceived CF occupation to a struggle for the division of political and economic influence among sectarian groups. Baghdad and the surrounding belts remain the focus for most sectarian violence, but it is also evident in Diyala, Kirkuk, and along lines of communications into the capital.
- Sunni extremists continue efforts to expel CF, make Iraq ungovernable and perpetuate sectarian violence; they seek the creation of a Sunni Islamic State of Iraq. Despite renewed efforts to further the "Islamic State of Iraq" declared in October, it has not received widespread support. AQI leadership is increasingly convergent with AQSL on goals and strategy. Capable cellular networks provide resilience despite CF operations disrupting leadership. Cooperation between AQI and other Sunni Resistance groups is growing, particularly in northern Iraq. Pursuit of viable chemical weapons capability continues.
- Shi'a extremist and militia influence on national and provincial political agendas exists through infiltration and intimidation, challenging Iraqi government authority. Shi'a extremists and militia use death squads to expand influence throughout Baghdad and surrounding belts; portray themselves as Shi'a protectors; prime agents of systematic sectarian cleansing. Shi'a militia increasingly draw Sunni neighborhood watches in Baghdad into sectarian violence who are willing to accept AQI for protection. JAM - Badr competition and internal friction within JAM may lead to localized intra-Shi'a conflict.
- Sunni Resistance continues decentralized effort to expel CF, prevent Shi'a economic and territorial gains, and reverse Sunni political marginalization. Localized cooperation with Sunni extremists continues in order to achieve tactical objectives. Hardliners augment ranks of Sunni extremists and provide professional military skills. Resistance cell and brigade leaders operate with autonomy, driven by local concerns - remain unmoved by national attempts at reconciliation.

1.4b, 1.4d


- Iraqi government remains challenged by sectarian agendas within key ministries, militia infiltration of security forces, failure to provide basic services, and lack of progress at reconciliation. However, sectarian violence remains the greatest strategic threat to achieving CF and GOI objectives in Iraq.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, MCFI//20170209~~
~~For display only to IRG~~

Area of Interest Update

- (U) Palestinian factions sign unity agreement; Iran fires anti-ship missiles during exercise
 - (U) Hamas, Fatah agreed to form unity government during Mecca peace talks
 - (U) Hamas reportedly refused to include “commitment” to peace accords with Israel, claimed equates to recognition
 - (U) Instead agreement states Hamas willing to “respect” peace accords if they do not “contradict Palestinian interests”
 - (U) Key cabinet posts of finance, foreign minister to be filled by independent or third party MPs
 - (U) Interior minister to be nominated later, likely neutral MP
 - (U) Iranian IRGC Navy claimed to fire anti-ship cruise missiles during Persian Gulf exercise
 - (U) Navy commander announced test of SS-N-4 missiles
 - (U) System was likely Chinese variant, C-801
- ~~(C//REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ Mecca agreement falls short of original international requirements to end financial sanctions; however, factional violence likely to subside.



C-801





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50

Sources:





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JAM Update

- OMS official said ISF/CF are 'trying to drag Sadrists into a confrontation' following capture of Sadrist Deputy Health Minister
 - Minister Hakem al-Zamili detained during CF/ISF raid, 8 Feb
 - Al-Zamili reportedly aided JAM, used ambulances to move weapons
- JAM commander for Mahmudiyah, Ahmed al-Lami, reportedly planned to use GoI connections to secure release of colleague
 - The detainee was reportedly being held by IP in Iskandariyah for unknown reasons
 - Al-Lami directs kidnappings, killings of Sunnis



1.4c

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53

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Current Situation

- **Shi'a militant use of ambulances**
 - **JAM allegedly receiving ambulances**
 - Reporting indicates Baghdad JAM members planning to receive additional ambulances from outside capital
 - **Ambulances utilized to transport contraband, personnel**
 - Utilization of ambulances an established TTP; allows unrestricted movement through checkpoints
 - Ambulances generally not searched by CF, ISF
 - Reporting indicates weapons, HVIs, kidnapped persons likely moved by ambulance in the past
 - Possibly linked to movement of JAM personnel, weapons out of Baghdad before expanded BSP operations
 - **JAM ties to Ministry of Health**
 - Deputy Health Minister Hakim al-Zamili arrested yesterday by ISF, CF for financial, materiel support to JAM
 - Al-Zamili former JAM commander during 2004 Najaf uprising
 - Reporting indicates MoH personnel, facilities involved in weapons smuggling
 - Significant portion of MoH FPS reportedly JAM members, sympathizers
- ***JAM use of ambulances proven method to facilitate operations, HVI movement in/around Baghdad; will likely continue in absence of effective, impartial MoH leadership.***

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SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:

1.4c

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Outlook: IO Themes and Effects

Terrorists and Foreign Fighters (T&FF)

- ISI/AQI propaganda volume up 124 to 560
 - Statement predicted limited US nuclear strike on 1.4b nuclear facilities
 - Called on Palestinians in Iraq to join ISI in Anbar, Salah-al-Din, and Diyala
 - Claimed to shoot down AH-64s on 2 Feb in Taji, 11 Jan over city of Muqdadiyah
 - Claimed to down US cargo plane on 20 Jan over Habaniyah with “shoulder weapon”
 - Criticized UAE message to IG; not addressing “correct authority” in Iraq
- AS propaganda volume down 5 to 44
- IAI propaganda volume down 5 to 91
 - Criticized the “conspiracy of America, Safawis, 1.4b and Shiites to liquidate Sunnis”; called on Sunnis to defend Baghdad and “never give up an inch” of the city
- Miscellaneous propaganda volume up 26 to 44

Sunni Resistance

- Propaganda volume up 59 to 107
 - Ba’ath Party emphasized the legitimacy and “national authority” of Izzat Ibrahim
 - Ba’ath Party appealed to “progressive forces” in the world to prevent execution of Taha Yasin Ramadan; warned of continuing US efforts to “eliminate symbols of Iraq”

Assessment: Propaganda volume up 199 to 846 claims. Attacks against CF aircraft remained significant theme. ISI attempting to reinforce image as legitimate alternative to Gol. Ba’athists continue to decry prosecution of former regime leadership as assault on Iraqi and Arab symbols. Expect higher level of SAFIRE against CF aircraft to continue due to perceived IO success, increased calls for unity of Sunni groups against Shia militants.

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STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- Early 2007

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1.4b, 1.4d

- Iraqi government remains challenged by sectarian agendas within key ministries, militia infiltration of security forces, failure to provide basic services, and lack of progress at reconciliation. However, sectarian violence remains the greatest strategic threat to achieving CF and GOI objectives in Iraq.

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56

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Regional Update

- (U) Islamic State of Iraq released video claiming shoot-down of CH-46 on 7 February near al-Karma
 - Video depicts possible object fired at helicopter; shows CH-46 on fire, trailing smoke; impacted behind trees
 - Last CH-46 loss occurred in September 2004
 - Stated attack conducted by “Anti-Aircraft” battalion, claimed to develop “new ways” to take down aircraft
 - Fourth shoot-down claim by AQI since 1 February
- (U) Iranian nuclear negotiator Larijani canceled planned trip to Munich to attend security conference
 - Larijani had proposed side meeting with G5+1 leaders during conference
- (U) IAEA announced significant reduction in aid for Iranian atomic projects according to UN sanctions
 - Of 55 technical aid projects 10 halted, 12 partially blocked

AQI Video Stills



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
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~~(C//REL TO USA, MCF)~~ **Assessment:** *Although video unsubstantiated, event will likely be perceived as AQI IO success; expect higher level of SAFIRE to continue.*

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
Sources:



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JAM Update

- Leading Sadrists making use of Sadr's absence
 - Planning new cultural organization, headed by Qays al-Khaz'ali
 - Sadr reportedly undecided whether to return to Iraq
- Sadrists condemn Iraqi Deputy Health Minister, Hakem al-Zamili's arrest
 - Called for US to show 'proof and evidence'
 - Sadrist Health Minister Shammari denounced raid before session of parliament
- JAM SW Baghdad commander Abu Iyah possibly making plans to travel to Iran, early Feb
 - Dates/times for possible departure unknown
 - Early Feb reporting indicated Abu Iyah was considering leaving JAM



1.4b, 1.4d, 1.4c

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59

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Intelligence Highlight

- **Shi'a militants use uniforms, official credentials**
 - **Multiple incidents indicate continued uniform use**
 - 08 February – Reported murder of civilians in Salah Ad Din Province
 - 25-40 armed men wearing IA uniforms murdered 12 male occupants of house northeast of Dujayl
 - All occupants murdered execution style
 - 09 February – 19 LN kidnapped by insurgents in IA uniforms south of Baghdad
 - **Use, availability of uniforms**
 - JAM reportedly using ISF uniforms, weapons, vehicles to commit acts of ethno-sectarian violence, kidnapping
 - Reports indicate JAM elements using IP identification in extortion efforts
 - Multiple recovered weapons caches nationwide have contained ISF, CF uniforms, identification
 - ISF, CF uniform items available in many Iraqi markets, including recent recovery in New Baghdad
 - **Utilization of ISF uniforms serves multiple purposes**
 - Allows freedom of movement to facilitate operations in, around secured areas
 - Discredit's IG ability to provide security, reinforces JAM as Shi'a protector

Assessment: Shi'a militants exploit ease of access to official uniforms, credentials to facilitate operations. Expect continued use as militants attempt to ease freedom of maneuver; resulting in degraded ISF legitimacy and ability to provide adequate, impartial security.


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SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:

1.4c, (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)



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STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- Early 2007

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- Shi'a extremist and militia influence on national and provincial political agendas exists through infiltration and intimidation, challenging Iraqi government authority. Shi'a extremists and militia use death squads to expand influence throughout Baghdad and surrounding belts; portray themselves as Shi'a protectors; prime agents of systematic sectarian cleansing. Shi'a militia increasingly draw Sunni neighborhood watches in Baghdad into sectarian violence who are willing to accept AQI for protection. JAM - Badr competition and internal friction within JAM may lead to localized intra-Shi'a conflict.
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1.4b, 1.4d

- Iraqi government remains challenged by sectarian agendas within key ministries, militia infiltration of security forces, failure to provide basic services, and lack of progress at reconciliation. However, sectarian violence remains the greatest strategic threat to achieving CF and GOI objectives in Iraq.

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Regional Update


- (U) Iranian state television reported two suspected al-Qa'ida members detained crossing border from Iraq
 - Suspects reportedly arrested after Ilam province, likely near Mehran border crossing
- (U) Protests continued over Israeli renovation near al-Aqsa mosque
 - Fifth consecutive day of protests, including Israeli police clashes with Palestinian youths throwing rocks
 - Renovation intended to repair damaged walkway within 35 acre holy site, near Dome of the Rock
- (U) Lebanese Defense Minister stated army will use seized weapons to defend against future incursions
 - Truck transporting weapons to Hezbollah from Bekaa Valley intercepted 9 Feb in Beirut by Lebanese Army
 - Hezbollah has demanded truck and weapons be released



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63

Sources:



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JAM Update

- JAM elements reportedly not concerned over Iraqi Deputy Health Minister, Hakem al-Zamili's arrest
 - Al-Zamili arrested 8 Feb for reportedly aiding JAM, using ambulances to move weapons

- JAM seeking to create new 'university' for training JAM members
 - JAM seeking Iraqi military training manuals on tactics, training, weapons, operations
 - JAM allegedly trying to recruit approx 150 former IA members to provide security, give lectures on fighting techniques

- JAM associate reportedly tipped-off regarding CF/ISF raid on husayniyah, 9 Feb
 - An unnamed hostage reportedly being held in husayniyah, JAM told to move before raid

Recent JAM Activity



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Intelligence Highlight

- **House-borne IEDs in MND-N**
 - **Baqubah HBIED targeted CF on 9 February**
 - Building exploded when inner door breached for cache search
 - Site of previous weapons cache
 - Caused partial collapse of building, trapped members of entry team
 - Several CF casualties resulted
 - **HBIEDs possibly emerging TTP in MND-N**
 - 02 January – IP station rigged with explosives after IPs abandoned building during AIF attack
 - 30 December – HBIED in Tal Afar, found and cleared
 - Each incident intended to target ISF or CF
 - **HBIED methodology developing**
 - Prior to 9 Feb incident, ineffective against CF; moderately effective against ISF, local nationals
 - Attack methodology may be used to protect high value assets; i.e. large weapons caches, safe houses, centers of operation

Assessment: HBIEDs to date have been rare, with relatively low success rate against CF. Expect continued employment of TTP as AIF seek to protect key infrastructure, inflict significant ISF, CF casualties to deter entry into strongholds.

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Notes & Sources:

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Outlook: Al-Duri Fights for Leadership of NBP

- Website articles challenge Syrian convention's legitimacy
 - Accused Muhammad Yunis al-Ahmad (MYA), Mizhar Matni Awwad, treason against the party and expels them; calls Tartus convention illegitimate
 - NBP in Iraq, confirms election of Al-Duri through non-standard "conspiracies" to undermine the legitimacy of leadership in Iraq
- Website articles attack Syrian meddling in Iraq
 - Stated Syrian agents set up meeting to undermine Iraqi Ba'ath party; urges Syrian regime to respect strategic interests of the Arab nation before the narrow national interests"
 - Jordanian Ba'ath Party claims Tartus convention masterminded by Americans; rejects invitation as show of support for Al-Duri
 - Iraqi National Alliance accuses Syria of masterminding the "malicious" attempt of exploitation as a "bargaining chip with US imperialism"
- Al-Duri receives Iraqi Insurgent group support
 - Al Murabitin Army pledges support to fight the Americans, Jews, Qarmatians, and Safawids under the leadership of Al Duri; swears to uphold dogma and ideology of Ba'ath movement



Assessment: Al-Duri will continue to fight for control of the New Ba'ath Party in an effort to retain his relevancy as a leader in the Insurgency. Al-Duri will rely on accusations of Syrian involvement and his previous standing in Saddam's regime to support his legitimacy as head of the NBP. MYA already has operational control of the NBP and it is unlikely Al-Duri will be able to effectively challenge MYA's leadership.

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<div>SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI//20170211// For display only to Iraq</div> <h3>STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- Early 2007</h3> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• The nature of the enemy and the conflict in Iraq has shifted from a Sunni-led resistance against perceived CF occupation to a struggle for the division of political and economic influence among sectarian groups. Baghdad and the surrounding belts remain the focus for most sectarian violence, but it is also evident in Diyala, Kirkuk, and along lines of communications into the capital.• Sunni extremists continue efforts to expel CF, make Iraq ungovernable and perpetuate sectarian violence; they seek the creation of a Sunni Islamic State of Iraq. Despite renewed efforts to further the "Islamic State of Iraq" declared in October, it has not received widespread support. AQI leadership is increasingly convergent with AQSL on goals and strategy. Capable cellular networks provide resilience despite CF operations disrupting leadership. Cooperation between AQI and other Sunni Resistance groups is growing, particularly in northern Iraq. Pursuit of viable chemical weapons capability continues.• Shi'a extremist and militia influence on national and provincial political agendas exists through infiltration and intimidation, challenging Iraqi government authority. Shi'a extremists and militia use death squads to expand influence throughout Baghdad and surrounding belts; portray themselves as Shi'a protectors; prime agents of systematic sectarian cleansing. Shi'a militia increasingly draw Sunni neighborhood watches in Baghdad into sectarian violence who are willing to accept AQI for protection. JAM - Badr competition and internal friction within JAM may lead to localized intra-Shi'a conflict.• Sunni Resistance continues decentralized effort to expel CF, prevent Shi'a economic and territorial gains, and reverse Sunni political marginalization. Localized cooperation with Sunni extremists continues in order to achieve tactical objectives. Hardliners augment ranks of Sunni extremists and provide professional military skills. Resistance cell and brigade leaders operate with autonomy, driven by local concerns - remain unmoved by national attempts at reconciliation.	
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Regional Update

- (U) Ahmadinejad vowed to continue nuclear development on Islamic revolution anniversary
 - Did not announce any new advancements or goals as expected
 - Chief nuclear negotiator met with EU officials in Munich, possible solutions reportedly discussed
 - UNSC resolution set 21 Feb as deadline for suspension
- (U) Israeli PM announced intention to further evaluate Palestinian unity framework
 - Olmert: "Israel neither rejects nor accepts the agreements"
 - "We, like the int'l community, are learning what was exactly accomplished and what was said"
 - Summit planned for 19 Feb between Olmert, Abbas
- (U) President Putin began regional tour in Saudi Arabia, due to also visit Qatar, Jordan



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
69

Sources:

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JAM Update

- Sadrist Health Minister Ali al-Shammari fears retaliation for Deputy Minister Zamili's arrest
 - Iraqi officials reportedly requested MoD protection for MoH employees
- JAM allegedly extorts funds from CF and Gol contractors to finance JAM activities
 - Contractors forced to perform sub-standard work on CF/Gol reconstruction projects, gives profits to JAM
 - Contractors exploited in mainly Shi'a areas controlled by JAM



Assessment: *Zamili loyalists likely angry over Health Ministers weak response to arrest, inability to have Zamili freed. Fear reflects possible divisions between hard-liners like Zamili and more moderate elements like al-Shammari. JAM continues to fund its activities through illicit means; JAM undermining integrity, viability of efforts important to Gol and CF reconstruction programs.*

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
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Intelligence Highlight
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• VBIED attack between Tikrit, Samarra<ul style="list-style-type: none">– VBIED targeted Ad Dawr IPs<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Device detonated near Ad Dawr IP Station• Blast caused significant structural damage, collapsing top two floors<ul style="list-style-type: none">– Damaged several IP vehicles outside station• Reporting indicates 12 casualties– High profile attacks against ISF in Salah Ad Din relatively uncommon<ul style="list-style-type: none">• In last 12 months average of two high profile attacks per month targeted ISF<ul style="list-style-type: none">– Accounted for 34% of all high profile attacks• VBIED preferred HP method of attack, accounting for 58% of HP attacks on ISF– No attack claim, methodology consistent with Sunni extremists, AQI<ul style="list-style-type: none">• First significant incident in this predominantly Sunni area in over 12 months• Reporting indicates recent concentration of AQI• Ad Dawr IP generally sympathetic to resistance groups; elements maintain good freedom of maneuver
Assessment: Attack likely conducted by extremists, possibly motivated by conflict with tribal, resistance elements; may indicate AQI effort to increase influence in vicinity of Ad Dawr.
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SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:

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CIDNE Trends Data



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STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- Early 2007	
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Regional Update

- (U) Iranian officials reacted to MNF press conference detailing EFP assistance to Shi'a militias
 - Iranian Foreign Minister called information “baseless propaganda”
 - Claimed attempt to divert attention from recent failures
 - During ABC interview, Ahmadinejad stated information represented “excuses to prolong the stay” of CF
 - Claimed “[MNF] would need a court to prove the case”
- (U) EU officials stated Iran showing “new ambition” to negotiate end to nuclear standoff
 - Claimed Larijani indicated intent to return to negotiations during Munich security conference
 - EU diplomats also discussed support for new UN sanctions to maintain pressure on Tehran
- (U) Al-Aqsa renovation work put on hold to allow public consultations




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Sources:



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JAM Recent Reporting

- Sadr bloc spokesman denies accusation Sadrist receiving support from 1.4b
 - Asserted Sadr Trend has no knowledge of any support by 1.4b to any party or armed group in Iraq
- OMS, Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) in Basrah agreed to launch plan to bolster national unity, disavow sectarianism
 - Scheduled to form joint security committees to implement Sunni-Shi'a 'brotherhood plan'
 - Plan aims to encourage reconciliation, coexistence



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Intel Highlight
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Golden Dome anniversary attack<ul style="list-style-type: none">– Complex suicide attack against local nationals in Rusafa<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Multiple devices targeted Shurja market, coincided with Islamic calendar anniversary of Al-Askari Mosque attack• Reports indicate SVBIED/VBIED/SVEST/IDF incident• CF reports indicate 52 x CIV KIA, 128 x CIV WIA– Incident reinforces trend of increased HP attack effectiveness<ul style="list-style-type: none">• HP casualties per incident rising since November<ul style="list-style-type: none">– Last three months effectiveness steadily increased from 26 casualties/incident in November to 36 casualties/incident in January• HP casualties per incident increased to 40 in February– No attack claims; targeting, methodology indicate AQI<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Attack time, targeting, use of VBIEDs targeting civilians consistent with Rusafa AQI VBIED network• Incident complexity, effectiveness demonstrates Rusafa VBIED network resiliency following recent CF targeting• Incident likely intended to exploit Shi'a sensitivity to significant date
<i>Assessment: Complex AQI effort coinciding with Islamic anniversary of Al-Askari Mosque attack intended to inflame sectarian violence by exploiting Shi'a sensitivity to iconic event, discredit Baghdad security operations. Expect Shi'a militants to respond with increased executions, IDF attacks over next 48-72 hours.</i>
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Notes & Sources:

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CIDNE Trends Data

Civil War Indicators		
Indicator	Trend	Reporting: 3 - 9 Feb 2007
Ethno-sectarian identities are the overriding force driving decision-making	↔	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Deputy Health Minister Hakim al-Zamili arrested by ISF/CF for financial, materiel support to JAM Leading Sadrists planning new cultural organization, headed by Qays al-Kaz'ali in Sadr's absence Sadrists attended Kirkuk conference of groups opposed to joining Kurdistan region, demanded Gol postpone implementation of Article 140
Unrestrained, self-sustained sectarian strife across multiple provinces	↓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> National Sectarian incidents: 193; down 7% previous week National Sectarian casualties: 947; down 11% National executions: 224 KIA; down 13% Baghdad Sectarian incidents: 146; down 20% Baghdad Sectarian casualties: 710; up 7% Baghdad executions: 159 KIA; down 33%
Ethno-sectarian mobilization	↔	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Shi'a militants use IA uniforms, official credentials to facilitate operations JAM using ISF/CF uniforms, weapons, vehicles, IP identification
Population movements	↔	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Internally displaced families in Iraq: IOM: 60,243 (no new data); MoDM: 72,000 families (no new verifiable data) Forced displacement predominately in Rashid
Assessment: Arrest of al-Zamili a positive step for Gol leadership. Expect Sadrists to continue attempts to project nationalist, political-cultural image to distance organization from successful ISF/CF targeting, improve public standing.		
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STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- Early 2007


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Regional Update

- (U) IEDs exploded on two buses in Christian area of Lebanon on eve of Hariri assassination anniversary
 - Public buses were transporting workers into Beirut from Christian area; 3 reportedly killed, 20 wounded
 - Attack occurred near home town of former President Amin Gemayel; son Pierre assassinated in November
 - Pro-government groups had planned mass rally in Beirut for today, marking anniversary
- (U) Vice Premier Shimon Peres stated Israel seeks “active recognition” from Hamas
 - Peres: Israel is “not just waiting for formal recognition” we also want “recognition in the form of [Hamas’] presence at peace negotiations”
- (U) Seven IEDs/VBIEDs targeted police stations east of Algiers; six reportedly killed, 30 wounded
 - Attacks claimed by “al-Qa’ida Organization in the Islamic Maghreb,” formerly GSPC



~~(C//REL)~~ **Assessment:** *Bus attacks likely to prompt larger-scale pro-government demonstrations, increase current tension; GSPC leveraging AQ franchise to increase purview.*

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
80

Sources:

Reuters, 13 Feb 07, Lebanon BUS Blasts Kill 3 on Eve of Hariri Memorial

OSC 1,4c Peres: Israel Seeks Hamas' 'Active Recognition'

AlJazeera.net, 13 Feb 07, Series of Blasts Hit Algeria



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Intelligence Highlight
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• VBIED hits Baghdad food warehouse<ul style="list-style-type: none">– VBIED targeted civilian queue outside food distribution center<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Food distribution center reportedly near College of Economic Sciences in Kadhamiyah<ul style="list-style-type: none">– Long line of Shi'a civilians waiting outside center for food• Distribution center located in mainly Shi'a Hurriya district• CF reporting indicates 25 x civilians KIA, 50 x civilians WIA– HP Attacks in Baghdad continue upward trend<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Last 12 months averaged 29 attacks per month<ul style="list-style-type: none">– 4 of last 5 months exceeded average• 19 HP attacks in February on track to exceed previous 12 month high of 36 set in January– Attack methodology, targeting suggests AQI involvement<ul style="list-style-type: none">• HP attacks in Baghdad continue to focus on gatherings of Shi'a civilians within Shi'a neighborhoods• Incident likely attempt to maintain ethno-sectarian pressure in Shi'a areas, discredit Baghdad security
<i>Assessment: AQI affiliated Sunni extremists continue targeting accessible groups of civilians in Shi'a areas to maintain ethno-sectarian violence, discredit IG, CF efforts to provide adequate security in Baghdad.</i>
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SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:

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CIDNE Trends Data

Open Sources

<http://english.aljazeera.net/News.aspx/print.htm>

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Outlook: Fallujah

- Security and governance will face increasing challenges throughout 2007
 - Fallujah remains reliant on CF support to mold a security environment conducive to effective governance
 - Tribal dynamics remain fluid, non cohesive; rivalries easily leveraged by AQI
 - Tribal and civic leaders, ISF targeted by M&I campaign
- Insurgents exploit CF/IA unit and division boundaries, retain freedom of movement
 - Reporting indicates insurgents move between Zaidon, Karmah and Fallujah
- Transient insurgents disperse to AO Raleigh due to increased CF/IA presence, security OPs in Baghdad and Ramadi; likely to re-infiltrate post CF/IA OPs
- Insurgents continue conscious effort to increase activity in Fallujah
 - 2007: assassination of IP, city councilman as security is handed over to the Iraqi Army
 - Targeting of Gov Center, JCC, and ECPs result in greatest # of CF/ISF casualties

Assessment: As Fallujah is weaned off CF support it will face increasing challenges. Insurgents will increase attempts to improve freedom of movement and reestablish the populations' acquiescence primarily through continued M&I targeting local community leaders and ISF.

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Greater Fallujah Area



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STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- Early 2007

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Regional Update

- (U) Anti-Syrian crowd honored Hariri in Beirut
 - 300,000 Lebanese demonstrated support for anti-Syrian government coalition in Martyr's Square
 - Speakers included parliament majority leader Saad Hariri, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt
 - Called for implementation of UN tribunal; blamed Syria for organizing bus bombings Tuesday
 - Tribunal approved by UN, pending ratification by divided Lebanese parliament
- (U) VBIED targeted IRGC bus in Zahedan, SE Iran
 - 11 IRGC members reportedly killed, 30 injured
 - Attack claimed by "Jundollah," Sunni group with reported ties to al Qa'ida, led by Abdolmalek Rigi
 - Jundollah has been blamed for previous kidnappings, SAF attacks in southeast Iran border region
- (U) "Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula" called for attacks against suppliers of oil to US



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
86

Sources:

Reuters, 14 Feb 07, Anti-Syrian Lebanese Crowds Honor Slain Hariri

Reuters, 14 Feb 07, Bus Bombed in SE Iran, Killing at least 11


Reuters, 14 Feb 07, Saudi Qaeda Group Wants World US Oil Sources Hit



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JAM Recent Reporting

- 14 Feb, Sadrists deny Sadr currently in [] accused CF of spreading propaganda
 - Sadrist representative, Hasan al-Zarqani stated Sadr has been in Najaf, accusation part of 'US-made report'
 - Sadr aide said report probably stemmed from campaign by Sadrists to submit false information of his location
- JAM elements allegedly planning to kidnap Sunni CF interpreter working at FOB Falcon, mid Feb
 - JAM believes interpreter informed CF of specific individual supplying JAM with [] 1.4b



1.4c

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Intelligence Highlight	
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• HP attack on ISF in MNF-W<ul style="list-style-type: none">– SVBIED targeted IP commander in Ramadi<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Reporting suggests chief of West Ramadi IP, LTC Sawam, targeted• 4 x ISF KIA, 7 x ISF WIA; 7 x CIV KIA, 14 x CIV WIA– High profile attacks on ISF in MNF-W steady, while high profile attacks on ISF in Ramadi elevated during January, February<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Eight attacks last month in MNF-W, slightly above 12 month average of six• January attacks in Ramadi equaled 12-month high of four set in October 06<ul style="list-style-type: none">– February attacks on pace to meet or exceed last month– Both months all HP attack in Ramadi were suicide operations• Half of all January HP attacks in MNF-W occurred in Ramadi– Attack methodology, targeting consistent with Sunni extremists<ul style="list-style-type: none">• AQI-affiliated groups continue to target ISF in MNF-W in attempt to maintain freedom of maneuver, discredit ISF, inhibit local recruiting, destabilize Anbar IG• Multiple reports indicate Ramadi-based tribes actively fighting AQI presence<ul style="list-style-type: none">– Unit reporting indicates improving LN attitude toward CF in western Anbar; AQI freedom to operate impacted by local tribes, CF operations	
<i>Assessment: AQI-affiliated elements targeting ISF in Anbar to regain freedom of maneuver through intimidation; demonstrates continued AQI concern of effective, locally-manned security forces. Recent increased concentration of suicide resources against ISF in Ramadi indicative of successful pressure on AQI along ERV.</i>	
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SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:

1.4c

CIDNE Trends Data

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Outlook: IO Themes and Effects

Terrorists and Foreign Fighters (T&FF)

- ISI/AQI volume down 375 to 185
 - Released three statements, one video claiming CH-46 loss in al-Karma
 - Claimed US afraid to implement BSP due to “recurring failure of former plans”
 - Criticized Tariq Al-Hashimi of Iraqi Islamic Party for urging implementation of BSP
 - Announced continuation of trial broadcast of “Voice of Caliphate” internet video
 - Announced “Dignity Plan”; three elements: fight Shi’a in Baghdad; escalate operations against CF; intensify efforts to absorb other jihadist groups
- AS propaganda volume down 13 to 31
 - Released 38th edition of online magazine “Harvest of Mujahideen”
- IAI propaganda volume down 7 to 84
 - Released statement supporting Palestinians and Al-Aqsa mosque
- Miscellaneous propaganda volume up 26 to 70
 - Mujahideen Army urged Ba’athists to “repent” and join them

Sunni Resistance

- Propaganda volume down 54 to 53
 - 1920 Rev BDE posted flyers in Fallujah denouncing AQI with “black list” of names
 - New Ba’athist group in Diyala: “Arabian Knights BDEs”

Assessment: Propaganda volume down 50% to 423 claims, driven by decrease in AQI claims. Downing of aircraft continued as theme; ISI’s messaging continues to focus on Operation Law and Order and portraying failure of US policy; “Dignity Plan” designed to give ISI an IO victory by casting OP L&O as explicitly anti-Sunni.

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STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- Early 2007

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1.4b, 1.4d

- Iraqi government remains challenged by sectarian agendas within key ministries, militia infiltration of security forces, failure to provide basic services, and lack of progress at reconciliation. However, sectarian violence remains the greatest strategic threat to achieving CF and GOI objectives in Iraq.

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Regional Update

- (U) President Abbas directed Haniyah to form unity gov't; complications remain for durable agreement
 - Haniyah will remain caretaker prime minister; has five weeks to form new cabinet
 - Vowed to “work in accordance” with Abbas’ direction; comments viewed as positive sign of diplomatic progress
 - Nominee for interior minister, disposition of Hamas’ 5,600-member police force still unresolved
- (U) Iranian Defense Minister stated Sadr not in Iran
 - Claimed reports of Sadr in Iran spread as “rumors”
 - Also denied reports of Qods force assistance to Shi’a militants
 - Stated “Iran does not supply Iraq with any weapons”
- (U) Turkish PM Erdogan indicated possibility of diplomatic relations with KRG
 - Dismissed military opposition, justified stronger ties with KRG as way to bring peace to both parties



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
92

Sources:

Reuters, 15 Feb 07, Abbas Asks Haniyeh to Form Unity Government

OSC 1.4c Defense Minister Denies Presence of al-Sadr in Iran

OSC 1.4c Turkey's Erdogan: Steps Could be Taken to Develop Ties with Kurdish Gov't




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JAM Recent Reporting

- Sadrist CoR member, Baha al-Araji commented on current role of Sadrists
 - Stated resistance now peaceful; movement striving for political, diplomatic solution
 - Claimed motive is Iraqi stability, not fear of CF
 - Denied reports of JAM leaders fleeing to Iran
 - Separate reporting, Araji argued JAM not a militia
 - Denied any foreign support for JAM, stated it would be disbanded once Iraq is secure, stable

1.4b, 1.4d, 1.4c



Recent JAM Activity


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Assessment: Sadrists continue to argue JAM does not pose threat to IG, can have legitimate role in stabilizing Iraq; increased frequency of claims primarily reflects desire to avoid CF targeting. JAM will sustain efforts to increase weapons and equipment stockpiles, in possible preparation to resume major activities following OPERATION LAW AND ORDER.

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
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Notes & Sources:

CIDNE Trends Data



Data represents reporting from CIDNE (contains NJOC data).
Data time period: 190001DEC06 – 252400DEC06

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STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- Early 2007

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Regional Update

- (U) Iranian authorities arrested 65 men suspected of involvement in Zahedan IRGC bus bombing
 - Attack claimed by Sunni militant group, Jundallah
 - Local police commander claimed suspects had “clear links” to US, UK intelligence services
 - Southeastern border region near Zahedan center of low-level unrest over past two months
 - Iranian officials have previously accused US, UK of supporting ethnic minority rebels in border areas
- (U) Western and developing IAEA representatives indicated consensus for proposed Iranian aid cuts
 - Proposed plan for technical aid reduction must be approved during next IAEA meeting, 5-9 March
 - Of 55 IAEA aid projects in Iran, 10 proposed to be frozen, 12 restricted to comply with Dec UN resolution



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
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Sources:

Reuters, 16 Feb 07, Iran Arrests Bomb Suspects, Police Say US Link

Reuters, 16 Feb 07, US, Developing Nations Accept Iran Aid Cut Plan



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JAM Recent Reporting

- 16 Feb, Sadr reportedly failed to appear for Friday prayers at Al-Kufah mosque
 - 15 Feb, OMS official said Sadr was in Najaf, might lead Friday prayers at Al-Kufah mosque to avert rumors regarding his departure for Iran
- JAM reportedly disseminated OMS order allowing displaced Sunnis to return to Al 'Amil area, SW Baghdad
 - Displaced Sunnis only permitted to return to Al 'Amil, not neighboring areas controlled by JAM
 - JAM encountering strong resistance from Sunni elements in Al 'Amil
 - Mid-Feb, media reporting indicated Sadrist allowed displaced Sunnis to return to Sadr City



Assessment: Sadr aides' statements regarding MAS whereabouts likely reflect uncoordinated guidance within OMS; Sadr likely feeling increased pressure to return to Iraq. The directed return of Sunni residents in Al-'Amil likely a local OMS decision; also possible effort to de-escalate conflict with Sunni extremists while JAM adopts lower profile.

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Outlook: Council of Representatives (CoR)

- 2007 Agenda will have large focus on delineating the roles of federal and regional governments
 - Hydrocarbon Law delayed by Kurdish concern over revenue distribution between central and regional governments
 - Law of "Governorates Not Organized Into Regions" complicating federalism debate; no date set for provincial elections
 - Budget recently approved, issue of funding for Kurdish Peshmerga remains unresolved
- Calls for Speaker Mashhadani's removal resurface
 - Inflammatory remarks and unprofessional business manner source of frustration for all groups including Mashhadani's own Tawafuq (Sunni) bloc
- Sadrist members return to CoR after two month boycott
 - Sadrists believe they demonstrated bloc's power to impact CoR quorum
 - Likely emboldened by perception of political leverage



Assessment: Fulfilling its role as a parliamentary body, the CoR emerged as a high-profile debating venue for critical issues in 2006, though reaching solutions acceptable to all political blocs continues to be the primary obstacle to progress. While managing to pass some key legislation, legislators continue to stall on controversial issues such as provincial elections and de-Ba'athification reform.

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STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- Early 2007


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1.4b, 1.4d

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
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Regional Update	
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• (U) Syrian President al-Assad arrived in Tehran to discuss bilateral policy<ul style="list-style-type: none">– Iranian news agency reported discussions will focus on Iraq, Lebanon– Al-Assad scheduled to meet with Supreme Leader Khamenei, President Ahmadinejad• (U) President Abbas issued appeal for acceptance of unity government agreement with Hamas<ul style="list-style-type: none">– Abbas aide: "This agreement was the best we could get. We cannot change it. You either take it or leave it."– Israeli FM Livni stated Mecca agreement does not meet requirements of international community– Summit between PM Olmert, Abbas scheduled for Monday; meeting to focus on requirements to end aid boycott	
1.4c	
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Sources:

Reuters, 17 Feb 07, Syria's Assad in Iran for talks on Iraq

Reuters, 17 Feb 07, Abbas Defiant as Rice Begins ME Push



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Intelligence Highlight
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• VBIEDs inflict significant civilian casualties in Kirkuk<ul style="list-style-type: none">– Two VBIEDs detonated near KDP building<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Devices detonated approximately three minutes apart• Undetermined whether primary target was KDP offices or nearby civilian market• Reports indicate 7 x CIV KIA, 83 x CIV WIA; minor damage to KDP building– Recent incidents had similar attack methodology<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Yesterday's attack third time VBIEDs detonated near market area in five months<ul style="list-style-type: none">– Each previous attack occurred on Friday during typical shopping hours– Targeting, methodology, threat reporting indicate AQI involvement<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Targeting likely aimed to discredit Kurdish authorities' ability to provide security• More indiscriminate attack methodology, civilian casualties suggests AQI• Recent threat reporting indicated possible AQI intent to attack political offices in Kirkuk with VBIEDs
<i>Assessment:</i> Kirkuk attacks remain focused on Kurdish political, civilian targets. Expect targeting trend to continue as Sunni extremists, resistance elements seek to destabilize security environment, undermine city's overwhelmingly Kurdish political leadership.
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Notes & Sources:


Tipper 02-026: Terrorist Activities

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CIDNE Trends Data



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Outlook: Zawahiri Calls for Sunnis to Unite

- 13 Feb 07, al-Qaida released audio statement by second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri calling on Iraqi Sunnis to put aside ethnic differences and unite under Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), Umar al-Baghdadi
 - Zawahiri's 22 Jan 07 message did not mention ISI or al-Baghdadi
- Zawahiri asked Kurds and Turkomen to work together with Arab *mujahidin*
 - Kurds should not be deceived into believing *mujahidin* are their Arab enemies
 - Kurds and Turkomen should cooperate with Arabs to support the "fledgling" ISI and help guide al-Baghdadi
 - All Sunnis should concentrate on fighting the "Crusaders" and "religion traders" (Shi'a)
- 20 Dec 06, Zawahiri message called on grandsons of Saladin to prevent secular wedge
 - 12th century, General Saladin led Muslim army against Crusaders
 - Saladin was Kurdish, originally from Tikrit

Assessment: *Zawahiri's overture to Kurds and Turkomen reflects attempt to promote ISI as legitimate institution representing interests of all Iraqi Sunnis. Support of Kurds and Turkomen would particularly benefit ISI in northern cities such as Mosul and Kirkuk, which have ethnically mixed Sunni populations. Expect similar statements by AQSL in attempt to coalesce Sunni support for AQI.*

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Regional Update

- (U) Khamenei, al-Assad pledged cooperation to confront US "plots" in Middle East
 - Iranian television reported statement made during meeting between al-Assad, Khamenei
 - Khamenei asserted US policies had failed, Syria, Iran should support Maliki's gov't, Lebanese nation's will
 - Al-Assad stated "they [US] want to weaken Muslim nations and regional government's resistance to America"
- (U) Iranian foreign ministry spokesman declared Iran will not agree to suspend uranium enrichment
 - Statement intended as response to Dec UNSCR mandating 21 Feb suspension deadline
 - Iranian officials have indicated they may consider compromise allowing continued centrifuge development
- (U) Burundi, Uganda to send 3,200 troops to Somalia



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(C//REL) Assessment: Double-digit inflation, 11% unemployment and lower oil prices--forcing reductions of popular subsidies--will continue to fuel anti-Western rhetoric in Iran, intended to channel proletarian frustration away from regime.

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109

Sources:

Reuters, 18 Feb 07, Iran, Syria Must Defuse US Plots

AlJazeera.net, 18 Feb 07, Syria and Iran Vow Unity Against US

OSC 1.4c SANA Reports Al-Assad's Meetings in Tehran

Reuters, 18 Feb 07, Iran Says will Not Halt Uranium Enrichment

Reuters, 18 Feb 07, Burundi to Send 1,700 Troops to Somalia


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JAM Recent Reporting

1.4b, 1.4d

- Sadrists may threaten key infrastructure in Basrah in retaliation for arrest of Sadrist Deputy Director for Electricity Distribution
 - Sadrists may have attempted attack on electricity stations mid-Feb 07
 - Considering attempt to cut off oil distribution

Recent JAM Activity



The map shows the southern region of Iraq, with Baghdad at the top and Basrah at the bottom. A legend in the top right corner indicates 'Recent JAM Activity' with a yellow circle icon. Several yellow circles are plotted on the map, primarily along the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. A red box in the bottom left corner of the map contains the text 'S//REL'.

1.4b, 1.4d, 1.4c

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Intelligence Highlight
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• VBIEDs target civilians in Baghdad<ul style="list-style-type: none">– Two VBIEDs detonated in New Baghdad market<ul style="list-style-type: none">• CF at scene surveying for market protection measures when attack took place• Received international media coverage• Discrepancies in casualty reporting:<ul style="list-style-type: none">– CF reported 5 x CIV KIA, 10 x CIV wounded– JCC reported 51 x CIV KIA, 124 x CIV WIA– VBIEDs increasingly effective, targeting civilians in Baghdad<ul style="list-style-type: none">• 79% of Baghdad VBIEDs in February targeted civilians• Baghdad VBIED attacks averaging 37 casualties per attack; January had record effectiveness with 40 per attack– Targeting, methodology indicate AQI affiliated Rusafa VBIED network<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Rusafa VBIED network possibly reacting to ISF/CF presence in Rusafa markets; targeting markets in New Baghdad<ul style="list-style-type: none">– Operation Safe Passage intended to secure Rusafa markets from VBIEDs• Intent likely to discredit security plan; maintain ethno-sectarian tension
<i>Assessment: AQI affiliated Sunni extremists maintaining pressure on Shi'a civilian population centers, gathering places. Expect AQI to continue unclaimed attacks against Shi'a concentrations in parallel with anti-OFAQ IO campaign.</i>
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
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Notes & Sources:

BBC News Online

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CIDNE Trends Data



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STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- Early 2007

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Regional Update

- (U) Iran to meet with IAEA prior to UNSC report
 - Chief nuclear negotiator, Larijani, arranged meeting with Dr. ElBaradei for today in Vienna
 - IAEA expected to issue negative report on Iranian defiance of Dec resolution to UNSC later this week
- (U) Russia freezes Bushehr plant construction
 - Russian atomic energy officials announced delay of Bushehr light-water reactor construction
 - Delay attributed to missed Iranian payments, impact of sanctions on nuclear equipment imports
 - Bushehr reactor contract worth \$800-million
- (U) Olmert-Abbas meeting ended w/out progress
 - Leaders affirmed commitment to two-state solution
 - Olmert stressed Palestinian gov't must accept international conditions for recognizing Israel




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
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Sources:



JAM Recent Reporting

- 18 Feb, media reported Sadr representative in Beirut, Hassan Zorqani, stated Sadrist support Fardh al-Qanoon
 - Zorqani said MAS's disappearance intended to help security plan succeed
 - Continued to deny Sadr in 1.4b refused to reveal Sadr's whereabouts
 - Stated Sadr will allegedly appear soon to reveal reasons for his disappearance
 - Separately, Sadr City clerics, tribal sheiks expressed readiness to support Fardh al-Qanoon
- Sadr CoR leader, Nassar al Rubay'i, stated all Sadrist ministers to be replaced



Assessment: Reported comments by religious and tribal leaders indicates broader support for Fardh al-Qanoon among Sadr City leadership; pressure is building on Sadr to either appear publicly or explain his absence. Reshuffle of Sadr Bloc ministers likely an attempt by Sadrists to put new face on political representation, create public impression of change in JAM/OMS leadership.

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Intelligence Highlight

- **Attack on IP near Ramadi**
 - **Two SVBIEDs targeted IP outpost NW of Ramadi**
 - **First SVBIED (sedan) detonated within ECP barriers**
 - Intent likely to disrupt ISF in preparation for second attack
 - **Second SVBIED (large cargo truck) targeted house north of outpost**
 - Unit analysis indicates target was likely IP leadership within house
 - Reportedly contained 1000-1500lb explosive; two chlorine tanks unconfirmed
 - **2 x ISF KIA, 3 x ISF WIA; 13 x CIV WIA (all women, children)**
 - **Similar attacks in vicinity on 28 January**
 - SVBIED (with 1-ton chlorine tank) targeted ERU compound 2km east
 - SVBIED targeted ISF on Route Mobile, 300 meters southeast
 - **Attack methodology, targeting consistent with AQI**
 - AQI-affiliated groups targeting Anbar ISF in attempt to maintain freedom of maneuver, discredit ISF, destabilize Anbar provincial government
 - November 2006 reporting indicated AQI, affiliates obtained 100lb chlorine cylinders, likely from water treatment plants
 - Two past attempts to incorporate 100lb chlorine cylinders in VBIEDs in Oct 06 unsuccessful, likely due to large amount of explosives relative to chlorine

Assessment: AQI-affiliated elements targeting ISF in Anbar to increase freedom of maneuver, demonstrating AQI concern of effective, locally-manned security forces; possibly continuing attempts to integrate chlorine into conventional VBIEDs for enhanced lethality, IO effect. Expect continued efforts to integrate chemicals, refine employment, limited by ability to obtain chemical material.

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Notes & Sources:

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CIDNE Trends Data

Civil War Indicators		
Indicator	Trend	Reporting: 10 - 16 Feb 2007
Ethno-sectarian identities are the overriding force driving decision-making	↔	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sadrists CoR member, Baha al-Araji stated JAM not a militia, it is striving for Iraqi stability, it is not receiving foreign support and will be disbanded once Iraq is secure, stable OMS reportedly ordered JAM to allow return of displaced Sunnis to Al Amil, SW Baghdad
Unrestrained, self-sustained sectarian strife across multiple provinces	↓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> National Sectarian incidents: 113; down 41% previous week National Sectarian casualties: 614; down 35% National executions: 136 KIA; down 39% Baghdad Sectarian incidents: 77; down 47% Baghdad Sectarian casualties: 536; down 25% Baghdad executions: 88 KIA; down 45%
Ethno-sectarian mobilization	↔	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No apparent Shi'a militant response to complex attack against Shi'a LNs in Rusafa on Golden Mosque Islamic anniversary JAM elements in Shaab receiving weapons from Iranian smugglers
Population movements	↑	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Internally displaced families in Iraq: IOM: 62,473 (up 2,230 from 17 Jan) MoDM: 94,041 (no new data) International Medical Corps (IMC) reporting corroborates increasing trend
Assessment: Violence in Baghdad declined as Iraqi, Coalition forces expanded operations, Sadrists projecting nationalist, non-militia image to avoid ISF/CF targeting, maintaining low profile. Sunni extremists continue VBIED attacks in attempt to provoke Shi'a militant response.		
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- 1.A. OSC RESTON VA, 13 FEB 07, *Iraqi TV Channel Interviews Al-Sadr Bloc MP on Militias. Operations*
- B. DODSPECONE, 160616Z FEB 07, *Baghdad-Area Jaysh al-Mahdi Disseminate Order*
2. CIOC Ethno-Sectarian Weekly Outlook 17 Feb 07
- 3.A. OSC RESTON VA, 12 FEB 07, *Xinhua Told: Bomb Attacks Kill 66 in Downtown Baghdad on Samarra Anniversary*
- B. JCMA FT George G Meade MD, 052000Z FEB 07, *Task 28-98/JCMA/070205/Daily Summary 023*
4. IMC/MODM/IOM/ IDP Update received 18 Feb 07

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STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- Early 2007

- The nature of the enemy and the conflict in Iraq has shifted from a Sunni-led resistance against perceived CF occupation to a struggle for the division of political and economic influence among sectarian groups. Baghdad and the surrounding belts remain the focus for most sectarian violence, but it is also evident in Diyala, Kirkuk, and along lines of communications into the capital.
- Sunni extremists continue efforts to expel CF, make Iraq ungovernable and perpetuate sectarian violence; they seek the creation of a Sunni Islamic State of Iraq. Despite renewed efforts to further the "Islamic State of Iraq" declared in October, it has not received widespread support. AQI leadership is increasingly convergent with AQSL on goals and strategy. Capable cellular networks provide resilience despite CF operations disrupting leadership. Cooperation between AQI and other Sunni Resistance groups is growing, particularly in northern Iraq. Pursuit of viable chemical weapons capability continues.
- Shi'a extremist and militia influence on national and provincial political agendas exists through infiltration and intimidation, challenging Iraqi government authority. Shi'a extremists and militia use death squads to expand influence throughout Baghdad and surrounding belts; portray themselves as Shi'a protectors; prime agents of systematic sectarian cleansing. Shi'a militia increasingly draw Sunni neighborhood watches in Baghdad into sectarian violence who are willing to accept AQI for protection. JAM - Badr competition and internal friction within JAM may lead to localized intra-Shi'a conflict.
- Sunni Resistance continues decentralized effort to expel CF, prevent Shi'a economic and territorial gains, and reverse Sunni political marginalization. Localized cooperation with Sunni extremists continues in order to achieve tactical objectives. Hardliners augment ranks of Sunni extremists and provide professional military skills. Resistance cell and brigade leaders operate with autonomy, driven by local concerns – remain unmoved by national attempts at reconciliation.

1.4b, 1.4d

- Iraqi government remains challenged by sectarian agendas within key ministries, militia infiltration of security forces, failure to provide basic services, and lack of progress at reconciliation. However, sectarian violence remains the greatest strategic threat to achieving CF and GOI objectives in Iraq.

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Regional Update

- (U) Lebanese cabinet approved request to UNSC for extension of Hariri assassination inquiry
 - Current inquiry expires in June; request is for additional year
 - Lebanon has experienced 15 attacks on politicians, journalists, public places since Hariri assassination, Feb 05
 - Proposed tribunal for Hariri suspects fueling political crisis
- (U) Larijani offered guarantee for peaceful nuclear intent
 - Guarantee offered to IAEA director in exchange for negotiations without preconditions
 - Larijani: “we would give the necessary assurances and guarantees that there will be no deviation ever toward nuclear weapons”
 - Ahmadinejad declared Iran will halt its nuclear fuel cycle if Western nations do the same
 - IAEA expected to issue report to UNSC today confirming Iranian defiance of Resolution 1737
 - ElBaradei: Iran has acquired expertise from pilot program; possibly only six months away from industrial scale enrichment capability




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



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Intelligence Highlight	
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Chlorine VBIED in Taji<ul style="list-style-type: none">– Truck VBIED detonated near market<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Truck reportedly carried 100lb of explosives, 2 x one-ton chlorine containers<ul style="list-style-type: none">– Both containers blown off truck, only one ruptured• Unit analysis indicates intent was to create casualties with chlorine<ul style="list-style-type: none">– Device effectiveness mitigated by one chlorine tank remaining intact• Local IP commander indicated primary target was likely nearby IP station, assessed driver was deterred by increased CF patrols in wake of JCC attack• 1 x CIV KIA, 113 x CIV WIA<ul style="list-style-type: none">– Most injuries due to inhalation of chlorine– Continued AQI effort to employ chlorine<ul style="list-style-type: none">• 19 February –VBIED possibly containing chlorine hit Ramadi IP station• 28 January –truck VBIED with chlorine tanks targeted Ramadi ERU compound– Reporting indicates many water treatment plants contain significant supply of chlorine; minimal security, accountability– International media coverage contributing to IO success of attack, will likely embolden future attempts to integrate chemicals into VBIEDs	
<i>Assessment: Second successful employment of chlorine to increase device lethality beyond initial blast. AQI-affiliated Sunni extremists continue to demonstrate intent to construct, employ unconventional VBIEDs, leveraging relatively accessible water treatment stocks.</i>	
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STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- Early 2007

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- Sunni extremists continue efforts to expel CF, make Iraq ungovernable and perpetuate sectarian violence. Despite renewed AQI efforts to further its goal of creating the "Islamic State of Iraq" declared in October, the idea has not received widespread support among Iraqis. AQI leadership is increasingly convergent with AQSL on goals and strategy. Capable cellular networks provide AQI with resilience despite CF operations disrupting leadership. Cooperation between AQI and other Sunni Resistance groups is growing, particularly in northern Iraq. However, tribal opposition to AQI is growing in Al Anbar, and there are signs it is emerging in Diyala. AQI continues to pursue a viable chemical weapons capability.
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1.4b, 1.4d

- Iraqi government remains challenged by sectarian agendas within key ministries, militia infiltration of some security forces, failure to provide basic services, and lack of progress in reconciliation. However, sectarian violence and sectarian distrust are the greatest strategic threats to achieving CF and GOI objectives in Iraq.

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Regional Update

- (U) Israeli officials claim UNIFIL, Lebanese army containing Hezbollah, arms smuggling continuing
 - PM Olmert: “when they try to surface now they are disarmed and arrested”
 - Claimed it is now “almost impossible” for Hezbollah to function in southern Lebanon
 - Deputy PM Peres called for UN to address arms smuggling, asserted “not enough being done”
 - Hezbollah chief Nasrallah declared effort to reconstitute depleted rocket supplies in early February
 - IDF Chief stated continued smuggling may force Israel to take further action
- (U) Somali “resistance” group vowed suicide operations against African Union peacekeepers
 - “The Popular Resistance Movement in the Land of the Two Migrations” declared AU force would be met with “exploding cars” and youths on suicide missions




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JAM Recent Reporting

- JAM likely responsible for assassination of Muthanna Provincial Council Deputy President, Muhammed Hanon, 20 Feb
 - Likely retaliation for arrest of three high-ranking OMS officials earlier on 20 Feb
 - OMS arrests prompted by 18 Feb IED attack against acting Provincial Director of Police (PDoP) convoy
- Current conflict follows recent cycle of violence involving suspected OMS/JAM in Samawah
 - Three senior OMS officials assassinated, mid-Feb
 - IP and suspected former Ba'athist killed by gunman, 11 Feb
 - JAM members reportedly arrested on 9 Feb following wounding of IP by unknown gunmen, 5 Feb



Assessment: Recent violence between JAM and provincial authorities is similar to conflicts in Samawah and Amarah in late 2006. JAM attempting to challenge IP to gain greater freedom of operation and political influence; will continue to target the Muthanna PDoP. Expect continued cyclical attacks with possible escalation of violence in near-term.

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Intelligence Highlight

- **Suicide attack in Najaf**
 - **SVBIED targeted civilians**
 - Device detonated near west entrance of old city
 - Vehicle reportedly owned by identified Baghdad resident
 - 11 x CIV KIA, 34 x CIV WIA
 - **High profile attack rate in Najaf low, consistent**
 - Five high profile attacks in last 12 months; typically one every other month
 - Yesterday's attack was first HP incident since December
 - All Najaf HP attacks over last 12 months targeted civilians
 - **No attack claims; targeting, methodology suggest AQI**
 - Continued focus on civilians in Shi'a areas to maximize casualties
 - Attack likely intended to exploit Shi'a sensitivity to iconic sites
 - Part of greater effort to provoke Shi'a militant response
 - May indicate AQI attempt to portray offensive through operations outside Baghdad

Assessment: SVBIED likely intended to exploit religious significance of Najaf; may reflect AQI effort to demonstrate offensive posture by shifting to areas with relatively less security outside the capital.

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CIDNE Trends Data

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Outlook: IO Themes and Effects

Terrorists and Foreign Fighters (T&FF)

- ISI/AQI volume up 169 to 354
 - Claimed “new weapons and techniques” used to shoot down 2 x AH-64, C-130
 - Released 40-min video critical of Sunni political involvement, duplicity of politicians
 - Denied media reports Abu Hamzah Al-Muhajir (AAM) injured
 - AQ strategist “Luis Atallah” called for IAI, AS, MA, Al-Rashidin Army to join ISI
- AS propaganda volume down 28 to 3
 - Urged Sunni residents of Baghdad to defend their “homes, mosques, and honor”
- IAI propaganda volume down 31 to 53
 - Released statement promising to avenge alleged rape of Sunni women by MOI officers
- Miscellaneous propaganda volume down 39 to 31

Sunni Resistance

- Propaganda volume up 27 to 70
 - Ba’ath Party expressed outrage over death sentence for Taha Yasin Ramadan; appealed to international human rights groups
 - Ba’athists threatened to attack petroleum facilities; warned Muslims to vacate areas

Assessment: Attacks against CF aircraft using “new techniques” remained significant theme this week. AQI continues to criticize OP Fardh al-Qanoon and Sunni leaders who engage in political process. Expect further references to alleged rape—leveraging Muslim sensitivity to female honor—in effort to rally Sunni opposition against ISF/CF operations in Baghdad.

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STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- Early 2007

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1.4b, 1.4d

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Regional Update

- (U) IAEA report to UNSC details unexpected Iranian enrichment progress
 - Iran has reportedly demonstrated faster enrichment advances than international monitors expected
 - 656 centrifuges installed at Natanz industrial enrichment facility, more than previously assessed
 - Unclear whether all technical issues have been overcome
 - Report indicates Natanz facility will likely achieve initial Iranian goal of 3,000 centrifuges by May
 - Iranian officials have outlined long-term goal of 54,000 centrifuges at Natanz
- (U) Hamas cabinet spokesman stated the group is encouraged by the Quartet meeting Wednesday
 - Quartet of Middle East mediators agreed to withhold judgment on sanctions until unity government formed
 - Hamas: “they have decided to wait until the new government is formed... they have not rushed to reiterate the continuation of the siege and sanctions”




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JAM Recent Reporting

1.4b, 1.4d, 1.4c

Iran-Iraq Border



- Sadrists reportedly plan to claim the UK's decision to redeploy select units from Iraq is a victory for Shi'ites, Sadr Trend
 - Sadrists considering offering UK a truce during the redeployment time period
 - In return, Sadrists would seek compensation, reconstruction

Assessment: A return of some JAM elements could impact Fardh al-Qanoon; however, returnees would likely adhere to Sadr's call to avoid engagement of CF. Sadrists likely to use UK redeployment as part of IO campaign, claiming they compelled UK forces to withdrawal. OMS would use facilitation of reconstruction projects to bolster public image and provide patronage.

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Intelligence Highlight

- **Indigenous EFP attempts**
 - **Makeshift EFP recovered 21 February near Ramadi**
 - Makeshift EFP was recovered from vehicle stopped for suspicious behavior
 - Device consisted of cylinder with concave plate at one end, blasting cap on opposite end
 - EOD analysis indicated device intended to be EFP; result was shaped charge
 - Would not have resulted in successful formation of projectile
 - **Crude EFP's recently recovered in MND-N**
 - 18 February – Five possible EFP's recovered by 4th IA DIV
 - Consisted of five tank rounds covered with possible copper shape materials
 - **Ramadi, MND-N incidents likely Sunni attempts to construct, employ what has become Shi'a premier weapon**

1.4b, 1.4d, 1.4c

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
Outlook: Security in the Hadithah Triad

- Local government officials sympathetic to insurgency undermining security efforts
 - Many influential local officials connected to insurgency
 - Corruption and removal of city councilmen inhibiting reconstruction
 - Fear of insurgent retaliation preventing recruitment of effective administrators
- IA/CF OPs impacting insurgent activity; effective IP development challenged by insurgent M&I
 - Nov, CF berming operations restricted insurgent freedom of maneuver
 - Local IP numbers remain low; IP success dependent on CF presence
- Security effects on insurgency serving to encourage residents, tribal resistance
 - Residents beginning to support local IP
 - Abu Nimr tribe has demonstrated opposition to insurgents in Barwanah



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Total attacks in Hadithah Triad



Date	Attacks
1-Nov-06	35
8-Nov-06	45
15-Nov-06	35
22-Nov-06	35
29-Nov-06	25
6-Dec-06	15
13-Dec-06	10
20-Dec-06	10
27-Dec-06	10
3-Jan-07	25
10-Jan-07	15
17-Jan-07	10
24-Jan-07	10
31-Jan-07	10
7-Feb-07	10
14-Feb-07	10

Assessment: Continued IA/CF presence in Hadithah Triad will provide conditions for local IP development, improved governance. Expect an increase in insurgent activity as AIF in the area attempt to regain dominance.

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STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- Early 2007

- The nature of the conflict in Iraq has shifted from a Sunni-led resistance against a perceived CF occupation to a struggle for the division of political and economic influence among sectarian groups. Baghdad and the surrounding belts **are** the focus for most sectarian violence, but it is also evident in Diyala, Kirkuk, and along the lines of communication into the capital.
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- 1.4b, 1.4d
- **The** Iraqi government remains challenged by sectarian agendas within key ministries, militia infiltration of some security forces, **inability** to provide **sufficient levels of** basic services, and lack of progress in reconciliation.
- Sectarian violence and sectarian distrust are the greatest strategic threats to achieving CF and GOI objectives in Iraq.


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Regional Update

- (U) Turkish authorities arrested Kurdish politician over comments regarding intervention in Iraq
 - Leader of Democratic Society Party branch in Diyarbakir charged with threatening public safety
 - Democratic Society Party has been previously accused of having links to PKK
 - Politician warned Turkish government against taking action over Kirkuk
 - Claimed 20 million Kurds in Turkey would rise against the state over attacks against Iraqi Kurds
 - Also stated, “any attack on Kirkuk would be considered an attack on Diyarbakir”
- (U) UN World Food Program released report stating 46% of Palestinians “food insecure”
 - Up from 2004 UN estimate of 35%
 - Previously secure workers such as fishermen, farmers, small traders increasingly reliant on food aid




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(C//REL) Assessment: Fringe elements will attempt to leverage sensitivity of Kirkuk's status during buildup to referendum to rally support bases.

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Intelligence Highlight

Insurgent surface-to-air attacks

- Recovered video depicts insurgent AAA assets
 - Video recovered in OP Excelen 3 of four small trucks with 14.5mm weapon, one large truck with 23mm weapon
 - 21 SAFIRE incidents last seven days; four above six month average of 17 per week
- AIF throughout Iraq likely attempting to obtain surface-to-air weapons
 - Additional attacks likely being planned by multiple elements
- CF aircraft represent iconic target, opportunity for significant casualties
 - Aircraft lost to hostile fire receive expansive media coverage, bolstering anti-coalition IO campaign
 - Attacks against responding ground, air units potential component of Complex SAFIRE TTP
 - After 7 February CH-46 incident, ground recovery assets encountered several IEDs en route to crash site



Assessment: Success of recent SAFIRE attacks and subsequent media attention likely to embolden AIF. Expect continued complex efforts to bolster IO, increase morale, maintain external funding support.


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SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:

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For display only to IIRQ

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- Early 2007

- The nature of the conflict in Iraq has shifted from a Sunni-led resistance against a perceived CF occupation to a struggle for the division of political and economic influence among sectarian groups. Baghdad and the surrounding belts are the focus for most sectarian violence, but it is also evident in Diyala, Kirkuk, and along the lines of communication into the capital.
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1.4b, 1.4d

- The Iraqi government remains challenged by sectarian agendas within key ministries, militia infiltration of some security forces, inability to provide sufficient levels of basic services, and lack of progress in reconciliation.
- Sectarian violence and sectarian distrust are the greatest strategic threats to achieving CF and GOI objectives in Iraq.

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~~For display only to IRQ~~

Regional Update

- (U) Iranian media reported IRGC operations killed 17 Kurdish "rebels" near the Turkish border
 - Operations took place in West Azerbaijan province
 - PJAK (Kurdistan Free Life Party) active in province
 - Kurdish militant group founded in 2004 with reported links to KGK (formerly PKK)
 - IRGC chief, Yayha Rahim, blamed foreign meddling
 - "Enemies headed by the United States, Britain and the Zionist regime... are seeking insecurity in some border areas"
- (U) Jordan's King Abdullah stated there's broad Arab consensus for Palestinian gov't to conform
 - Called on new Palestinian government to adhere to demands of Quartet of Middle East mediators
 - Demands include: recognition of Israel, renunciation of violence, acceptance of interim peace accords w/ Israel




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Sources:



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SECRET//REL TO: DOD, WHC//20270225//
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For display only to INQ

Intelligence Highlight

- **Attack on civilians in Habbaniya**
 - **SVBIED detonated near mosque, IP station, school**
 - Device detonated as worshippers were leaving mosque
 - Open sources report the mosque was Sunni; Imam reportedly criticized AQI in Friday sermon on 23 February
 - Preliminary BDA estimates 65 x CIV KIA, 100+ x CIV WIA, 13 x IP KIA; 1 building partially collapsed
 - **February HP attacks on civilians in MNF-W above average**
 - Only 5% of HP attacks targeted civilians in MNF-W in last six months
 - 17% of HP attacks in February targeted civilians; highest since June 2005
 - **No attack claims; targeting, methodology indicate AQI**
 - Targeting of civilians, intent to create mass casualties more prevalent in Baghdad attacks
 - Intent likely to intimidate Anbar leaders to support AQI or face similar retaliation
 - Recent reporting indicates select Anbar leaders increasing anti-AQI rhetoric
 - Tribal leaders working against AQI elements in Ramadi, several other ERV cities

Assessment: Attack likely intended to intimidate Anbar leaders and civilian population into support for AQI and other extremist elements operating in MNF-W. High civilian casualties from attack may serve to galvanize AQI opposition in Habbaniya area.

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SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:

1.4c

CIDNE Trends Data

Reuters <http://www.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleId=USCOL36065620070224>

NY Times online article

Page 147 redacted for the following reason:

1.4b, 1.4d, 1.4c

Approved for Release

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STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- Early 2007

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148

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Regional Update

- (U) Iran expressed defiance prior to meeting of Group of Five + One today
 - Ahmadinejad declared nuclear program had no “reverse gear”
 - G5+1 expected to consider expanded sanctions and travel bans against nuclear officials
 - Russia, China limited scope of sanctions, prevented travel ban in December
 - Foreign ministers of seven Muslim countries met in Pakistan, warned of “dangerous escalation”
 - Ministers represented Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan—all predominantly Sunni
 - Regional media portrayed meeting as foundation for united Sunni bloc in opposition to Iran
- (U) Iranian officials claimed missile launched into space orbit, later rescinded claim
 - Officials later stated missile was sub-orbital, intended for scientific research



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
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Sources:

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JAM Recent Reporting

- Sadr statement delivered by Director of OMS in Baghdad in front of thousands in Sadr City
 - Statement called on ISF to take the lead and not rely on CF in Fardh al-Qanoon (FAQ), to protect Iraqis 'through faith, patience, sacrifices, solidarity, and affection for your people'
 - Continued: ISF does not need help from the 'occupier, its planes, and tanks'
- JAM/OMS in al-Hindiyyah and Karbala reacting to pressure from ISF/CF, mid-Feb
 - Stemmed from GOI efforts to find assassins of Karbala official Akram al-Zubaydi, and FAQ
 - Raids reportedly held in Karbala; expected in al-Hindiyyah
 - JAM allegedly enjoys local support; under orders not to clash with CF



Assessment: Statement indicates Sadr's intent to retain public visibility while out of the country, emphasize support for GOI rather than CF efforts in FAQ. Intensified ISF/CF effort to find al-Zubaydi assassins likely to incite conflicts in Karbala and al-Hindiyyah regardless of alleged JAM orders to not clash with CF.

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
<small>SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI//20170226// For display only to IRO For display only to IRO</small>
Intelligence Highlight
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Suicide attack on civilians in Baghdad<ul style="list-style-type: none">– Suicide vest detonated at al-Mustansiriyah University Annex, Adhamiyah<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Device reportedly detonated at the Economics and Business Department• Open sources report suicide bomber was female; institution controlled by JAM• Multiple VBIED attack against main university campus, 16 January• 15 x CIV KIA, 20 x CIV WIA– Baghdad HP attack rates steady over last three months<ul style="list-style-type: none">• 45 February HP incidents so far this month, on par with December (45), January (46); average of 44 per month over last 12 months– No attack claims, targeting and methodology indicates AQI<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Late December reporting indicated AQI intended to attack al-Mustansiriyah Univ.• Targeted predominantly Shi'a area IVO Sadr City• Methods may indicate attempt to circumvent restricted freedom of maneuver<ul style="list-style-type: none">– Use of SVEST to facilitate movement, adapting to increased security measures– Female suicide bomber possible attempt to utilize non-traditional suicide profile<ul style="list-style-type: none">» 30 Jan 07: male dressed as female detonated SVEST outside Balad Ruz mosque» 16 Aug 06: last confirmed female suicide attack, Muqadadiyah
Assessment: <i>AQI likely executed high profile attack as part of campaign to provoke militant Shi'a response. Expect further use of more mobile methods and possibly non-traditional profiles to achieve Shi'a civilian casualties.</i>
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SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:

1.4a

BBC News Online



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STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- Early 2007

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1.4b, 1.4d

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Regional Update

- (U) Foreign nationals killed in Saudi Arabia
 - Three French citizens killed in SAF attack by suspected Islamic militants in northwest desert
 - First attack targeting foreigners in Saudi Arabia since Sep 2004, previous efforts claimed by AQ
- (U) G5+1 began drafting new UNSC Resolution
 - Representative stated: “we had a productive first discussion of the next steps... we also considered how best to re-engage with Iran”
 - G5+1 officials planned further discussions this week
- (U) Abbas, Olmert agreed to meet w/in two weeks
 - Abbas stated new meeting intended to continue “dialogue and consultations”
 - Abbas met with President Mubarak to discuss mechanisms for renewed development aid from EU




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Sources:



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JAM Recent Reporting

- Media reports MAS conducting purge of some JAM members, allowing CF to arrest them
 - Moves supposedly part of organizational overhaul
 - Members allegedly had not obeyed Sadr's orders
 - Claimed Sadr also expelled two commanders who reportedly published a DVD documenting killing of Sunnis in Baghdad
- Sadrism publication reported "thousands" of Sadrists staged demonstration in al-Nasariyah, 25 Feb
 - Protesting US media campaign against MAS



Assessment: Media reports of Sadr purging JAM elements may be IO campaign to improve JAM's image and demonstrate his continued control over organization. Sadr also trying to present JAM as protector of all Iraqis. Demonstrations in al-Nasariyah may reflect OMS concerns about media reports that Sadr is in [redacted] 1.4b, 1.4d to JAM.

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Intelligence Highlight

- **Civilian attacks in Balad Ruz**
 - **Anti-tank mine kills six Shi'a local nationals**
 - 25 February - family received threat to leave their home or be killed
 - Family was returning home on advice from 3/1/5 IA
 - All victims were from same family
 - Two additional AT-mines were found and cleared in the same area
 - **Recent executions followed CF operations near Turki village**
 - 21 February – 17 Shi'a males executed by AIF wearing ISF uniforms
 - Followed Operation Turki Bowl II
 - 25 November 06 – 21 Shi'a males executed by AIF wearing IA uniforms
 - Followed Operation Turki Bowl I
 - **Sunni extremists near Balad Ruz attempting to assert dominance**
 - Sunni extremist elements targeted by Turki Bowl II were able to flee to avoid CF targeting, possibly returning to area
 - Incidents possibly reflect retribution against Shi'a perceived to assist CF during Turki Bowl II
 - Sunni conducting murder, intimidation operations in area reportedly led by "the Council", operates out of Turki Village area; was target of Turki Bowl operations

Assessment: *Murder, intimidation operations likely taking place in the Balad Ruz, Turki Village area in effort to reassert Sunni extremist local dominance, conducting retribution attacks against those perceived as complicit with ISF/CF.*

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SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:

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CIDNE Trends Data

Reuters <http://www.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleId=USCOL36065620070224>

NY Times online article

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Civil War Indicators		
Indicator	Trend	Reporting: 17 - 23 Feb 2007
Ethno-sectarian identities are the overriding force driving decision-making	↔	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prime Minister dismissed head of Sunni Waqf Bureau, Ahmad Abd-al-Ghafur al-Samarra'i, following Waqf statements that the alleged rape was proof of failure of Fardh al-Qanoon
Unrestrained, self-sustained sectarian strife across multiple provinces	↓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National Sectarian incidents: 71; down 37% previous week • National Sectarian casualties: 377; down 39% • National executions: 85 KIA; down 38% • Baghdad Sectarian incidents: 44; down 43% • Baghdad Sectarian casualties: 153; down 71% • Baghdad executions: 49 KIA; down 44%
Ethno-sectarian mobilization	↔	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AQI and IAI call for Sunnis to avenge Sunni woman who claimed to have been raped by Mol forces on jihadist website
Population movements	↔	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Internally displaced families in Iraq: IOM: 62,473 (no new data); MoDM: 92,000 (no new data); IMC 108,663 (no new data)
Assessment: Despite declining violence in Baghdad due to Fardh al-Qanoon, rape allegations and actions against Sunni Waqf will further Sunni distrust of Shi'a-dominated police and GOI. Although Shi'a death squad activity remains low, renewed high-profile attacks following calls for revenge by AQI and IAI will continue to be the short-term threat to perpetuating the cycle of violence and undermining OFAQ.		
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1. A. OSC RESTON VA, [1.4c] *Iraqi Premier Nuri al-Maliki Dismisses Head of Sunni Waqf Bureau*
 B. DODSPECONE, 231917Z FEB 07, *Senior Sadrists, Including Muqtada al-Sadr, Reported to be More Pessimistic*
2. CIOC Ethno-Sectarian Weekly Outlook 24 Feb 07
3. A. DODSPECONE, 240656Z FEB 07, *Iraqi Officials Review Rape*
 B. USCENTCOM, 232125Z FEB 07, *Terrorist Threat Advisory Message: AOR*
 C. OSC RESTON VA, [1.4c] *Al-Qa'ida in Iraq Leader Promises to Avenge Alleged Rape of Sabrin*
4. IMC/MODM/IOM/ IDP Update received 22 Feb 07

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STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- Early 2007

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Regional Update

- (U) Russia indicated desire to lift economic sanctions against Hamas
 - Russian FM met with Hamas leader Meshaal to discuss potential steps to end embargo
 - Meshaal called on EU, UN to cooperate with Russia to alter Quartet's position concerning Palestinian gov't
 - Claimed to speak for the Arab and Islamic region
- (U) Larijani suggested Iran would re-adopt NPT Additional Protocol (AP) if case returned to IAEA
 - Larijani suggested offer during meeting with IAEA director; UNSC would have to send issue back to IAEA
 - Iran adopted AP in Oct 2003, rejected AP in Oct 2005 following election of hardliners including Ahmadinejad
 - Additional Protocol created by IAEA to allow international monitors access to undeclared facilities




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Sources:



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JAM Recent Reporting

- Sadr aide stressed Sadr has not withdrawn his support for Fardh al-Qanoon
 - Aide accused media of misinterpreting Sadr's statement made Sunday
 - Aide mentioned statement was advice to ISF 'which are capable of achieving better results without CF assistance'
- Sadrists met in Karbala in mid-Feb to discuss impending arrests of suspects in assassination of Karbala official Akram al-Zubaydi
 - Sadrists agreed to follow MAS instructions to avoid conflict with Gol
 - Plan to seek increased support from Karbala provincial officials, handle matter politically until 'crisis' passes



Assessment: Sadrists continue efforts to demonstrate support for new security measures; boost image of OMS/JAM by reassuring public of support for ISF, Fardh al-Qanoon. Sadrists will likely allow arrests of al-Zubaydi's assassins to go forward in order to avoid conflict with Gol.

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Intelligence Highlight	
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• High Profile attacks target ISF in Mosul<ul style="list-style-type: none">– Two truck suicide VBIEDs targeted IP compound<ul style="list-style-type: none">• First truck breached outer wall, enabled second truck to breach inner wall• Blasts followed by SAF, RPG• IP station nearly destroyed; 7 x IP KIA, 14 x IP WIA, 1 x CIV KIA, 28 x CIV WIA– VBIED detonated near COP Resolve<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Damaged main COP building; 3 x CF WIA, 5 x IA WIA– VBIEDs targeting ISF, effectiveness in Mosul increased over past 2 months<ul style="list-style-type: none">• January (5), February (7) exceeded 12-month average of two VBIEDs per month• Yesterday's 53 casualties second highest on record for attacks against ISF in Mosul; highest since 19 October 2006 incident with 56 casualties– No attack claims; threat reporting, targeting, methodology indicate AQI<ul style="list-style-type: none">• 18 February – AQI elements reportedly planned suicide attack on Mosul IP, specifically targeting Hammam al-Alil, Chief of Police• AQI VBIEDs in Mosul generally target ISF• AQI reportedly seeking to disrupt, intimidate Mosul ISF to improve FOM	
Assessment: High profile attacks on ISF intended to disrupt ISF operations, intimidate personnel in attempt to increase AQI freedom of maneuver in, around Mosul. AQI efforts to target ISF facilities, leaders likely to continue as increased ISF effectiveness further impacts AQI operations.	
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SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:

1.4a

CIDNE Trends Data


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Outlook: Emerging Chlorine VBIED Threat


- **Chlorine Attacks:**
 - 20 Feb 07 – At Taji: 2 x 2000lb tanks w/ 100lb HE
 - 28 Jan 07 – Ar Ramadi: 1 x 2000lb tank w/ 300lb HE
 - 30 Oct 06 – Al Walid: 1 x 100lb tank w/ 130mm and 7x122mm mortars
 - 21 Oct 06 – Ar Ramadi: 2 x 100lb tanks w/ 12x120mm mortars
- 2007 attacks indicates chlorine-to-explosive ratio has improved gas dissemination
- **Report Trends: Intelligence on insurgents' chlorine interest**
 - 22 Feb 07 – Sunni insurgent intent to conduct chlorine attacks at Karbala, Najaf and Babil (NFI)
 - 1 Feb 07 – insurgents' target Karkh Water Treatment Plant (WTP) as chlorine source
 - Late-Dec 06 – chlorine transportation engineer linked to extremists' network
- **Chemical Availability:**
 - 100lb and 2000lb tanks are stored at over 200 WTPs Iraq wide; 26 serving Baghdad
 - Tanks poorly accounted for and remain largely unsecured

Iraqi Water Treatment Plants



S//REL

2000lb Chlorine Tanks at Karkh



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STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT	
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•	1.4b, 1.4d, 1.4c
•	1.4b, 1.4d, 1.4c
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• The Iraqi government remains challenged by sectarian agendas and corruption within key ministries, militia infiltration of some security forces, inability to provide sufficient levels of basic services due to a lack of state capacity, and lack of progress in reconciliation.• Sectarian violence and sectarian distrust are the greatest strategic threats to achieving CF and GOI objectives in Iraq.	
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